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Abstract 
 
The issue of state failure within the international system has been a perplexing 
phenomenon in our increasingly mobile and modern society. The question of why some 
states succeed in developing into strong states within the international environment and 
why some fail is a question often overlooked. The focus of this thesis will be on three key 
factors that contribute towards state failure. The research will show how these three key 
factors: outdated state infrastructure, lack of economic development, and external 
intervention contribute to the occurrence of this phenomenon. Analyzing these key 
factors will highlight how state failure occurs within a case study. The chosen state for 
the focus of this thesis will be the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). By focusing 
on this case I plan to cross-reference factors that have been commonly used to gauge 
state failure. This will show that external factors, as well as internal factors can cause 
detrimental obstacles in state development. The unit of examination of these three 
factors will be focused on the DRC. My research will show that the three key factors are 
the reason why the DRC became a failed state and that due to external events the DRC 
was able to maintain an image of a stable environment, while the citizens of the country 
suffered. As a result of the rising influence of globalization and the push for development 
in the international system state failure has become a preoccupation for scholars.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In my attempt to understand the phenomenon of state failure in the international 
system, it is hard not to see the perplexing phenomenon and the devastating effects that 
a failing state brings upon its people and surrounding regions. In my thesis, I will be 
focusing on the issue of state failure in our modern times, as well as how state failure is 
the result of non-functioning state institutions, the absence of economic development, 
and the effects of external intervention. These are key factors that I, as well as many 
other scholars who have approached this topic in the international relations field, have 
made attempts to understand when delving into the cyclic nature of state failure in our 
global society. The issue of the state and its manmade boundaries has evolved to a 
point that the condition of a state has become an issue, which has crossed borders of 
what we as a society have considered a traditional state system. Much like a close-nit 
neighborhood, everyone affects everyone, which highlights the importance of this 
research showing why this is necessary to see how states decline in legitimacy and how 
they may succeed in the reformation of their state identity. The past has shown that 
external influence and intervention have been the desired solution to developing states, 
especially how these external influences interact with states that have weakening 
governmental systems. This thesis will focus specifically on the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), as a case study, to underscore how state failure ultimately led to the 
degradation of the DRC.  
 
2 
Research Question 
Why did the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) experience state failure? 
The research will analyze or examine the factors and the external/internal influences that 
contribute to the progression or regression of the state in the international environment. 
In addition to this, the research will show how the effects from external/internal factors 
inhibit the development of the state and ultimately can lead towards a state’s own failure. 
The factors that will be discussed in this research will highlight points of weakness or 
strengths that would lead to the delegitimizing or legitimization of the state’s identity. 
Hypothesis 
 In this thesis, I hypothesize that outdated state infrastructure, lack of 
economic development, and external interventions have contributed to state failure in 
the DRC. The analysis will rely on both primary sources (CIA Fact book 2012, UN 
Statistics Division, and the World Bank) and secondary sources (scholarly articles and 
books) to examine the progression of state failure within the DRC and how these factors 
contributed to the overall condition of the country.    
State Failure and the DRC 
Since the end of the Cold War, the instance of state failure occurring in the 
international community has increased. The factors surrounding such occurrences have 
been scattered and in some cases significant to that particular state. The ability to gauge 
if a state was going down the path of failure has been hard to determine, but 
international relations scholars have identified certain factors that maybe generalized 
toward a state exhibiting signs of failure. The determination of a state’s level of success 
or failure is often displayed on a spectrum that gauges the degree of state failure. 
The occurrence of state failure in the current international environment has to do 
with the emerging issue of globalization in our society. The increasing mobility of 
communication and international markets has created an environment that is being 
3 
pushed by policies that promote the reduction of state institutions and an increase in the 
free market approach. These policies and global institutions (for example, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund) have made states interact with one another 
and compete in a global arena. The different levels of development that states have 
achieved since the occurrence of such a global environment have created rifts between 
competing countries. The 1980’s brought forth new forms of policies and the 1990s 
pushed them toward global levels. The importance of this occurrence within my research 
is that it reveals a backdrop for state interactions within our current international 
environment.  
There have been occurrences of state failure all over the world. Central Africa 
has exhibited a very strong example of state failure compared to many other regions. 
This level of disruption in development has spurred the curiosity of many social science 
researchers, but the result of this research has not revealed a definite answer to why 
states fail. This occurrence is one of a shifting nature. Each country that exhibits signs of 
failure or the complete collapse of its governmental institutions has varying factors to 
contribute towards its relative decline. One way of approaching such a problem is to use 
a case study to highlight factors that are gauged to show the level of progression a 
particular state is making.  
By using the DRC as an example I will illustrate that the factors proposed for 
observation: state infrastructure, lack of economic development, and external 
intervention are essential to the strength of the state. These factors directly impact how 
a state functions and its possibility of development in the short/long term. The 
importance of this data is to show that external or internal influences direct the 
progression of a state. These influences are being imposed by a growing international 
standard that promotes a global market and a reduction in the role of governmental 
institutions within the state.  
4 
The degradation of state infrastructure, lack of economic development, and 
external intervention contribute to the occurrence of state failure in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. The DRC is an example of a state falling into a downward spiral 
of mismanagement, corruption, and a loss of state legitimacy. In this research, it is 
important to rely on previous scholarly work on the subject matter. It especially focuses 
on state development, state failure, and the policy agenda set out by the West to resolve 
state failure issues. The analysis will rely on secondary resources, previous scholarly 
work on the DRC, as well as primary resources (government statistics). The nature of 
the occurrence and the inability to relate all cases of state failure/development to one 
another demonstrates the limited scope of the purposed research.  
Conceptual Clarification 
State Failure is a relatively new concept in our modern times, but has old origins. 
Empires and communities have been failing since the beginning of time, but the concept 
of the state is a relatively new occurrence. The categorization of what constitutes a failed 
state has been hotly debated and still is to some extent. The definition from leading 
social science researchers varies from scholar to scholar, but there are some general 
aspects that seem to be in most definitions proposed in this field of research. Brinkerhoff 
characterizes state failure as, the lack of human security, public services, and a lack of a 
credible entity within the international theater.1 The lack of sustainability by the state 
seems to be an essential trait for what constitutes state failure. Kraxberg determines that 
state failure is a vacuum of authority where what was once an establishment that 
brought forth these services collapses on itself.2 As a result the state loses its legitimacy 
and separates its identity from the people that live within its boundaries. In contrast, 
Brooks takes a devil’s advocate approach by looking at how state failure is categorized 
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 Brinkerhoff, Derick, W. “Rebuilding Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross-Cutting Themes.” Public    Administration 
and Development. 25. (2005):4. 
2
 Kraxberger, B. “Failed States: Temporary obstacles to Democratic Diffusion or Fundamental Holes in the World Political Map?” Third World Quarterly. 28. 6. 
(2007): 1057. 
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and labeled by focusing on the standard that it is compared to.3 This may reveal a 
disadvantage in gauging state failure and a development goal that may not be 
realistically met for some states exhibiting signs of state failure. King and Zeng approach 
a perspective of state failure that reveals the potential risk for neighboring states as the 
run off of refugee and criminal activity spreading to neighboring countries. They highlight 
the fact that failed states have failed governments that cannot project power and 
authority within the state, which is usually followed by a humanitarian crisis or violent 
conflict. The result is the destabilization or the weakening of the neighboring states as 
refugees retreat from the region. 4 Bates brings a very simple but powerful definition of 
state failure, by claiming that state failure is the powerful preying on the weak and as a 
result the state implodes from its own corruption.5  Milliken, Gros, and Rotberg have 
similar definitions of what constitutes state failure in that it is a failure of the government 
to perform the basic duties, healthcare, education, security, and the development of 
public institutions in order to benefit the people of the state.678For the purpose of this 
thesis I will define state failure as the inability of the state to provide basic services to its 
people. These services include: health care, security in agriculture development, 
effective state institutions, human rights, education, and rule of law, among others. 
Through the loss of these basic rights the states legitimacy starts to erode and its 
governmental system will crumble. The identity of the state and its connection to its 
people begins to disappear. State Collapse is the complete disintegration of the state 
and its ability to function as a symbol of power and stability within the boundaries of the 
state. Furthermore, the occurrence of state collapse symbolizes the loss of state identity 
for the government and the citizens residing in the state. 
                                                             
3
 Ehrenreich, Rosa. “Failed States, or the State as Failure?” The University of Chicago Law Review. 72.4. (2005):1160-61. 
4
 King, Gary and Zeng, Langche. “Improving Forecast of State Failure.” World Politics. 53. 4. (2001): 623. 
5
 Bates, Robert. “ State Failure.” Annual Review of Political Science. 11. (2008): 1-12. 
6
 Gros, Jean-Germain. “Towards a taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti.” Third World Quarterly. 17. 3. 
(1996): 456. 
7
 Rotberg, Robert. When States Fail: Causes and Consequence. Princeton University Press (2003): 2. 
8
 Milliken, Jennifer and Krause, Keith. “State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies.” Development and Change. 33. 
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State Infrastructure is defined in this thesis as the institutions that are created to 
meet problems that are plaguing the citizens of the state. These problems are related to: 
collecting/issuing taxes for state development, upholding laws against criminal activities 
and to maintain the peace within the region, and the ability of the government’s to project 
its power and create a unifying identity among its citizens. 
 Economic Development is the growth of the domestic/international economic 
industry within the state and the interaction between these industries with 
domestic/international industrial entities to promote the overall state economy. External 
Intervention is the intervention by external groups who use foreign policy, foreign aid, or 
foreign invasion of a state that may negatively influence the development of that state. 
Chapter Overview 
The proceeding chapters introduce the correlating literature on state failure and 
the DRC, a historical timeline, an introduction to state failure within the DRC and the 
outdated state infrastructure, the lack of economic development, external intervention, 
and the conclusion of the thesis. These chapters will outline the reasons for state failure 
as well as the contributing factors that have led the DRC to its present condition. 
Chapter two is a comprehensive overview of literature of the DRC and the state 
failure paradigm. In this chapter, I outline key scholarly research on the history of the 
DRC and the nature of state failure. In addition to this, I correlate this literature to help 
paint a clearer picture of how state failure occurred within the country. 
In chapter three, the focus is on the historical background of the country. I 
highlight important dates that are relevant to the construction of the state and how these 
dates support the three factors I propose in my hypothesis. In conjunction to this, the 
timeline helps to give a point of reference for the audience to relate historical events and 
the development of state failure factors. 
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Chapter four is an introduction to the three factors of state failure. In this 
introduction I briefly highlight the importance of these factors in conjunction with state 
failure in the DRC. Also, I finish the chapter with the first factor, outdated state 
infrastructure. 
Chapter five is an overview of the lack of economic development, which is the 
second factor in my research. The chapter reveals how economic policy and the 
occurrence of an ineffective regulatory system have inhibited the growth of the 
domestic/international economy in the country. In addition to this the chapter highlights 
other points of interest that have further degraded the country’s ability to grow 
economically. 
Chapter six is an overview of the impact of external entities on the country. In this 
overview I will discuss the emergence of groups such as NGO’s, state groups, private 
interest groups, and private industry into the country. I will discuss the effects of such 
groups in relation to the previous two factors. 
The seventh chapter will be a summary of information from the previous chapters 
and correlation of this information. The chapter will also tie the three proposed factors 
and how they relate to state failure in the DRC. Furthermore, the process of state failure 
and how interrelates with these factors will be discussed further in an overview of the 
research. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had a turbulent transition from its 
Belgian colonial rule to independence. The years of 1960 to 1965 were a disruptive 
period for the Belgium Congo. The transition of governmental leadership happened 
swiftly and often. Not until 1965 did the Congo receive an unknown individual that would 
be the country’s longstanding leader who would not conclude his reign until the late-
1990s. In his wake, he would leave a country that was in utter chaos. In the midst of this 
chaos the state infrastructure would be left in shambles, the citizens starving, war 
causalities and conflict would be ripe within the region, and there would be little hope for 
the country’s revival. 
Mobutu’s Rise to Power 
In the midst of the state’s death throws, Mobutu Sese Seko became a leader who 
used his political position, stability of the state, and the international environment as a 
means to reap the benefits of the newly independent state’s abundant natural resources 
and use any means necessary to hold on to his political position. The ability of Mobutu to 
maintain his political position and (in at least the first two decades of his reign) maintain 
a model of a prospering state was his ability to use external aid and the already existing 
colonial infrastructure as an appearance of stability. Yet, what most Western aid donors 
failed to realize was that the large amount of aid going into the Congo/Zaire was used by 
Mobutu and his political elite for their own personal gain rather than the maintenance 
and development of the state’s infrastructure. Carmenta highlights the West’s failure to 
recognize the outcome of the aid distribution: 
9 
 …that most Western powers failed to pay attention to developing viable institutions of 
governance in Africa which could support the independence of new states. As a consequence, 
African authoritarianism emerged from a series of interrelated phenomena that arose out of the 
colonial legacy (most states were conceived in violence, there was little transformation in the 
economy and the local ethnic elite’s commitment to the Western imposed structures was low)
9
.  
 
Mobutu’s legacy was fueled and pushed forward by external aid and intervention, which 
undeniably helped to create a dependency for the country. 
The Emergence of Zaire  
During the 1970s and the 1980s Mobutu utilized the focus of the Cold War as a 
means to extract large amounts of money and aid from Western countries in their efforts 
to combat the reach of communism. The United States and allying countries fed a 
steady flow of resources to countries like the Congo, which later would be renamed 
Zaire by Mobutu, and created a reliance between the African country and Western 
governing powers. As a result of this, the development of democratic governance that 
was the focus of the Cold War alliance was a figment of the imagination within the 
Central African state.  
Fukuyama alludes to Mobutu’s rise to power and his ability to reallocate a large 
portion of the state’s resources for himself and leave the rest of the society in what is 
termed as a ‘predatory state’. Mobutu used the public sector to acquire property rights to 
benefit his needs.10 The social divide became apparent to the international community in 
the late-1980s and 1990s, when in the early-1980s the Zairian state started to show 
signs of decline, but was still held together by external contributions.  
Zaire became a predatory state for its citizens; the average citizen received little 
help from its governing powers while those same governing elites took everything. Reno 
highlights the internal aspect of life within Zaire and explains that citizens within the 
country initially organized to fight the reign of Mobutu and his ability to take essential 
                                                             
9 Carmenta, David.”Assessing State failure: Implications for Theory and Policy”. Third World Quarterly. 24. 3. (2003): 412. 
10
 Fukuyama, Francis. State –Building: Governance and World Order in the 21
st
 Century. Cornell University Press. 2004: 16. 
10 
resources from the citizens and the relocation of these resources to external entities to 
reinforce his hold on power within the country, but they were not successful.11  
The upheaval that occurred in the early 1990s was coming to head with the 
aggravating factors that could be attributed to the end of the Cold War, when the West 
lost interest in maintaining aid to its Central African affiliates and the decades of abuse 
and lack of infrastructure maintenance led to state failure. The international community 
was forced to try and understand why after decades of assistance is the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (previously Zaire and the Belgian Congo) not in better standing. 
Van de Walle referred to the lack of organization and planning by the revolutionary 
movement that occurred in the 1990’s, which did not have a real political strategy for the 
transformation of government. Much like the 1960’s, the people wanted a new 
government and change within their society, but did not find a solution to this problem.12 
Many may argue that from the beginning, just after independence, the lack of political 
strategy amidst all of the chaos of independence, the abuse of not only Western powers 
in their struggle for control of the international environment during the Cold War, the 
political struggle, corruption, the failing infrastructure, and the lack of a viable economy 
all led to the crumbling remnants of the DRC. In the midst of these many factors I believe 
that they contributed to state failure in the DRC. 
State Infrastructure 
Since the 1960s the DRC has been relying on the state infrastructure from the 
previous colonial government as its means to support the citizens of the state. Mobutu 
had the ability to transform the Belgium system of government into his own and utilize it, 
but he chose to rely on the already existing infrastructure to suit his means. These 
means led to a social divide between the political elite and the rest of the population. He 
did this by creating an authoritarian state that also resembled a democratic one at the 
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 Reno, William.  Warlord Politics and African States. Lynne Rienner Publishers 1998: 219. 
12
 Van de Walle, Nicolas. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge University Press. 2001: 107. 
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same time. The state infrastructure did not evolve as the decades of Mobutu’s rule went 
on. Additionally, the lack of establishing an internal/external economy for the country led 
to the reliance on external loans and aid from Western powers that were detrimental to 
an already deteriorating state infrastructure. Rotberg captures this in his passage: 
 Plausible though it is to detect historical continuities between the horrors of the Leopoldian 
system and the Mobutu’s brutally exploitative dictatorship, or between the sheer oppressiveness 
of Belgian rule and the excesses of the successor state, in the last analysis Mobutu himself must 
be seen as the determining agent behind this vertiginous descent into the abyss. What set 
Mobutu apart from other neo-patrimonial rulers was his unparalleled capacity to institutionalize 
kleptocracy at every level of the social pyramid and his unrivaled talent for transforming personal 
rule into a cult and political clientelism into cronyism. Stealing was not so much a perversion of 
the ethos of public service as it was its raison d’être. The failure of the Zairian state was thus 
inscribed in the logic of a system which money was the only political tool for rewarding loyalty, a 
system that set its own limitations on the capacity of the state to provide political (public) goods, 
institutionalize civil service norms, and effectively mediate ethno-regional conflicts.
13
  
 
 Even though this was a slow process, it was helped along by external factors, such as 
the rivalry of the Cold War. 
External Influences 
 As with many African nations in this conflict, external catalyst provided potential 
opportunities for directing forces in state behavior. One of the major contributing external 
factors is the rivalry of the Cold War, as a result allowed super powers to use developing 
states as their battlefields in the spread of their brand of ideology. The DRC was no 
exception in this matter. Mobutu positioned himself as the recipient of aid from the West 
such that most of the DRC’s GDP comprised of external assistance. Van de Walle 
further reinforces the fact that the involvement of both the Soviet Union and the United 
States in state affairs in Central Africa directly affected the state’s development and the 
ability for Mobutu to remain the leader of Zaire.14 The decades of corruption and abuse 
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  Van de Walle, Nicolas. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge University Press. 2001: 135. 
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led the DRC into decay during the 1990s and eventual conflict that ousted the 
authoritarian leader.  
Additional external catalyst effecting Mobutu’s reign was the genocide in Rwanda 
in 1994. The refugee flow from this event bled into the eastern Congo as millions of Hutu 
refugees fled the terrible massacre happening in Rwanda. The camps setup to house 
this on-flow of armed refugees became a beacon for Rwandan forces. The Rwandan 
army invaded the camps and revealed a weakness in the Mobutu regime when foreign 
forces attacked/occupied parts of Zaire. Rotberg states that one of the biggest 
contributing factors for the ousting of Mobutu in the mid-1990 is the refugees who 
emerged from the Rwandan genocide in 1994.  
Over 1.2 million refugees crossed the border into Zaire, setting up refugee camps 
along the North and South border of Kivu. Many of these refugees were members of 
militias and former members of the Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR). As a result, the 
Rwandan government acted on this widespread refugee on-flow, by conducting pre-
emptive attacks on the refugee camps in Zaire. The act of attacking the camps and the 
inability of Mobutu to defend against this invasion into Zaire displayed a weakness in his 
regime. The resulting operations after this initial assault resulted in the disintegration of 
Mobutu’s army and a campaign against Mobutu himself.15 The Rwandan invasion and 
pre-emptive attack aided in the eventual downfall of the Mobutu regime and the 
succession of the Kabila regime in the late-1990s and into the millennia.  
Lack of Economic Development 
What had become apparent in this crisis is that the DRC was not self-sufficient. 
The lack of economic development in the domestic and international state economy was 
due to corrupt officials and backdoor policies that benefited the elite and not the state or 
its citizens. In this lack of self-sufficiency, state failure was borne. The DRC is continuing 
                                                             
15 Rotberg, Robert. I. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. Brookings Institute Press, 2003: 36. 
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to face serious and detrimental obstacles in its growth. In the following sections my 
research is focused on what state failure is and how it relates to aspects of the DRC. 
State Identity 
State failure affects everyone within the state and in some instances outside of 
the state. Yet, the purpose of the state is to act as a mediator between its people and the 
outside world while maintaining a balance that meets the needs of its citizens. Acting as 
an internal and external mediator between the dangers and possible success of the 
state, Rotberg defines the boundaries a state structure needs to construct for its people 
to establish a national consciousness: 
Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized method of delivering political (public) goods 
to persons living within designated parameters (borders). Having inherited, assumed, or 
replaced the monarchs of yore, modern states focus and answer the concerns and demands of 
citizenries. They organize and channel the interests of their people, often but not exclusively in 
furtherance of national goals and values. They buffer or manipulate external forces and 
influences, champion the local or particular concerns of their adherents, and mediate between 
the constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamism of their own internal 
economic, political, and social realities.
16
  
 
 Rotberg’s assertion is that the state is a modern extension of the people of that region 
and an outlet for the citizens through state institutions to be recognized within the 
international system as an identifiable group. The idea of group identity has been 
evolving for centuries but the necessity of its survival in our modern times is essential for 
successful state participation within the international community. 
In some aspects of the literature, scholars believe that the nation-state paradigm 
is falling apart in our mobilizing global age. The rise of communication technology and 
accessibility of travel to all parts of the world has weakened the identity and state 
structure societies need to prosper in our current environment. Despite this perspective, 
in our current times state identity is an essential factor in the development of the state; 
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 Rotberg, Robert.I. When States Fail: Causes and Consequence. Princeton University Press (2003): 2. 
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furthermore, it is essential to have this identification to establish development for the 
betterment of its people and the growth of prosperity within its borders. Enereich argues 
that it is essential to have this identifiable trait within the international community to be 
able to sustain a global presence and institute policy for the benefit of the state itself. As 
a result, non-state entities cannot function in the international environment or abide by 
formal treaties.  
State Failure 
A state exhibiting signs of state failure will not be recognized or have the ability to 
participate in treaties or agreements concerning human rights, international trade, or 
environmental issues. Enrenreich highlights that not being able to participate in these 
international agreements further disintegrates the relationship between the state 
government and its citizens, because it is not able to protect citizens with international 
contracts/policies.17 In addition to the state’s acceptance within the international society, a 
state’s identity can work against a country. By not successfully developing a unifying 
identity within the state, in most cases, it is not accepted as an entity within the 
international realm.  
One of the major arguments within state failure research is that African countries 
were accepted as states soon after the elimination of colonialism. For this reason these 
states did not experience similar historical development as most states did in our current 
international society. The tendency for dealing with this problem is not to notice it as a 
problem, but recognize its effects on states and citizens outside of the territorial 
boundaries of that particular country. State failure in many respects is the elephant in the 
room or the monster under the bed, we have yet to really want or feel the need to deal 
with the problem in a serious manner, despite this reluctance to face the problem, and 
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not addressing it can have devastating effects on the surrounding states within the 
international community as whole.  
In many respects the failure of a developing state to make the mark as a stable 
and successful entity is blamed on the leadership and its administration. The action of 
these groups direct the state and paves the way of that country’s development, but in 
most cases there are a list of external factors that need to be addressed in recognizing 
why a state may fail. According to Gros the external dimension of state decay and the 
importance of recognizing the impact on external influences from the international 
environment are essential in developing states. By doing this the signs of state failure 
can become more apparent.18 There are two reasons for this, first since the occurrence 
of state failure in the modern state system there has always been some form of external 
influence guiding it or external factor that pushed the state toward a direction of decay. 
For example, in the case of the DRC the Cold War played a significant role in the states 
development. Without the monetary aid from the United States, the stability and stamina 
of the Mobutu regime would not have likely lasted as long. This is not say that there is a 
conspiracy always apparent in state failure, but the nature of our international society 
leaves us more and more connected in our current times. The second reason is that the 
international system is a competitive system that is always changing , states trying to 
find ways to better themselves and get the upper hand.  
For the purpose of this thesis some of the external forces that I will be focusing 
on are: colonialism, the Cold War, and Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs). The 
reasons for the focus on these three factors is that they all had or are currently having a 
long lasting effect on the course of state development on the DRC. Much like many 
African states these three factors directed the course of the state’s construction and 
ultimately led to its current state structure in our modern era. 
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State Collapse 
The effects of state failure and potentially state collapse can be devastating to 
neighboring countries. In many respects it can lead to the destabilizing of those 
surrounding states because of the outflow of people from that particular state, criminal 
element that are left unchecked, and the fact that the state is now an ungoverned space. 
As a result, the surrounding states are burdened by the refugee flow, healthcare issues, 
and the overall impact on the economy. Additionally, if state collapse occurs the 
ungoverned space could harbor criminal elements, as well as create a possible refuge 
for undesirable elements that could plague surrounding state’s stability. This after-effect 
of the destabilization of state structures within a failing society reveals the necessity to 
mitigate such problems at the start by addressing the international emerging threat of 
state failure to the international environment. State collapse is everyone’s problem not 
just the state in question and if left unresolved will continue to become worse not better. 
There are not many cases of state collapse, the fact that there are any still represents a 
threat to the structure of state identity in its entirety leaving into question what identifies 
the state as a state.  
For the purpose of this thesis I will not go further into what constitutes a state, but 
it is important to recognize that state identity is in question when dealing with state 
failure. Milliken and Kruase comment that even though this phenomenon is only seen in 
a handful of cases it still brings into question where other states are on the 
development/failure spectrum: 
Full-blown cases of state collapse, which involve the extreme disintegration of public 
authority and the metamorphosis of societies into a battlefield of all against all, remain relatively 
rare; in recent years only states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Congo/Zaire and 
perhaps Albania seem to fit this definition. But if state collapse remains a rare phenomenon and 
state maintenance (in weakened or decayed capacity) remains the norm, it is nevertheless true 
17 
that many more states are today failing to provide security and public order, legitimate 
representation, and wealth or welfare to their citizens.
19
  
International Response to State Failure 
The international response to this problem has been mixed. The effectiveness of 
the results has not been universal and approaches to answer this difficult question need 
to be adapted to fit each state differently. Yet, the answer to the question of how to deal 
with state failure has been slow to develop. Langford reveals a perspective to solving 
this problem by changing the direction of state intervention policy. By moving more 
towards an intervention policy that is comprehensive and coordinating this approach by 
compiling the historical experiences in dealing with the particular state and using these 
experiences as guide to establishing a relationship with that state before intervening in 
the state’s affairs.20 Other reactions to continued state decay are to punish the state as if 
it was still an acting and controlling entity of its citizens. By doing this the state exhibiting 
signs of failure would be viewed as a sovereign and stable state entity, which would fall 
under the eye of the international community and be punished under that context.  
In the instance of state failure, the state by many definitions is not an acting 
state, but a shell or fragment of what is recognized as a functional state in the 
international community. Herbst describes the failures of the international community in 
dealing with this problem: 
 …the current static state system in Africa has institutionalized weakness and decline, 
irrespective of the sources of failure. The current complete disassociation between a country's 
economic and political performance and its sovereign status means that, no matter how poorly a 
country performs, the international community continues to give it legitimacy, pretends that it is a 
functioning state, and supports efforts to preserve its integrity.
21
  
 
The lack of attention to this problem only adds fuel to the fire. The recognition of a state 
that is still not functioning in the boundaries of what a state is supposed to be is not 
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beneficial to the state or the international system surrounding it. One of the interesting 
aspects of state failure/collapse is that every state that exhibits signs of state 
deconstruction is different. There is not a model that is universal to all aspects of state 
failure. This is important to point out, because the phenomenon is ever changing and the 
environment mitigates the changes. Furthermore, the state indirectly alters the course of 
these neighboring states by their own actions. Herbst points out that these problems in 
the case of the African state failure phenomenon are unique in each case. A state may 
exhibit factors that lead to its destabilization in one instance, but are not seen in other 
cases of state failure.22  
State Infrastructure, State Development, and the DRC 
State infrastructure is one of the essential elements to the development of a state 
experiencing signs of state failure or that has experienced a total collapse. The purpose 
of the state infrastructures is to establish institutions to meet problems that are plaguing 
the citizens of the state, collect and issue taxes for state development, uphold laws 
against criminal activities, maintain the peace within the region, and to broadcast the 
government’s power so that it can project its influence and create a unifying identity 
among its citizens. Rotberg characterizes the lack of state infrastructure as the inability 
of a state government to project its power and provide stability throughout the region.23 
The ability of the state to hold and project influence of the government is essential in 
maintaining development throughout the governing infrastructure within its borders. In 
the case of the DRC and many other post-colonial African states it is the transition from 
a colonial infrastructure to an independent identity. Herbst notes that the European 
model of state infrastructure had factors that helped it in its initial transition. The 
European model of government, which was introduced to pre-colonial regions as a form 
of government did not have the time or environmental factors that led the European 
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system to be successful. In the DRC these environmental factors were accelerated and 
resulted in the lack of development in addressing common governmental problem that 
snowballed into substantial issue for the state, which eventually disrupted social 
services, as well as maintaining control of the state overall.24 
    The case of the DRC, the legacy of the colonial infrastructure may or may not 
have helped the transition from colonial government to an independent one. The 
transition from colonial governance, led the state to adopt pre-existing colonials laws as 
a means to keep order. As a result, these laws were based in a society that runs by a 
European-based system of governance. The absence of this system led to an ineffective 
governing system within the DRC.25 There was a lack of transitional factors that could 
help the country to a stable government structure.  
In this thesis I argue that the DRC resulted in a discovery of abuse of these 
transitional factors and Mobutu relied on these pre-established colonial state institutions 
to a point that they became unusable in the long-term. In most cases, if the functioning 
state institutions are in place at the time of independence they may be used for a short 
time to maintain order until a better system is established to meet the needs of the 
people. An example of a blatant abuse of post-colonial institutions is Mobutu’s retaining 
of colonial state institutions already established to run his country. Because the DRC‘s 
state infrastructure was suffering from a lack of development due to corruption and 
misuse of monetary aid, the needs of the citizens as well as the development of state 
institutions to meet these need never occurred resulting in state failure. 
External Aid and State Infrastructure Involvement 
The common factor that is seen in post-colonial countries in Africa is a failure to 
reestablish a link between the people and their government. In order to meet the needs 
for international aid, African states often paid lip service to demonstrate democratic 
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development within their countries. Rotberg argues that it is impossible to establish a 
democracy without creating an independent state first and that traditional ownership 
patterns creates a dependency among the states citizens that inhibits the development 
of political independence.26 What Rotberg is alluding to is that these states from the 
beginning were depending on external aid and assistance when democracy was 
purposed as their system of government. Without an established state system that has 
maintained order, a democracy cannot evolve.  
In many cases, especially in the DRC, state officials fall into corrupt practices and 
establish a cycle of decay that starts on the inside and works its way out. The private 
companies and donor agencies come to the aid of the state and establish private 
institutions in place of public institutions, securing their place in that country’s 
infrastructure. While private companies create markets for the international community in 
aiding these failing countries, they are not helping them in the traditional since, but 
enabling them to establish a solid public infrastructure within the government. 
Additionally, by establishing these private institutions massive layoffs of the public sector 
employees occur and political loyalties are established between private sector parties 
and the governing parties.  
Since the end of the Cold War and the end of a strategic flow of aid to post-
colonial countries, state infrastructures were in shambles from their lack of development 
and deep rooted corrupted state officials: 
 What has changed since the end of the Cold War is the extent to which private firms are 
filling in for direct strong-state action and financial backing in places conventional diplomacy has 
written off as irrelevant or hopelessly corrupt. The alternative has become tacit support for a 
weak-state politics that increasingly resembles warlord politics rather than conventional 
strategies for state building.
27
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The outcome is that what is left from the conclusion of the Cold War and the invasion of 
private firms taking the place of state institutions are a form of institutional politics that 
catered toward an authoritarian regime. 
The solution to this recently established problem has been debated within the 
international community as well as social science scholars. Langford outlines certain 
fundamental factors that a state and its institutions need to establish before development 
can occur. These factors include security of the population, economic stability, and the 
well-being of the state. Langford believes this can be achieved, but only through a 
massive intervention by external entities, such as external actors, groups, and states 
seeking to aid the country and restoring ability to self-govern. 28  The problem with 
establishing functioning state institutions is that the ruling administration needs to root 
out corruption and ineffective state officials before this can happen. A restructuring of 
this political environment not only needs to function, but regain trust from its citizens to 
becoming a working entity within state borders. State infrastructure development is only 
one portion of the problem, but to address state failure and promote development of the 
state itself a list of factors need to be addressed at once.  
The Need for State Identity Development in a Failing State 
The social link between a state’s administration and its citizens is essentially the 
motivating factor that could propel a state to development. The decomposition of state 
authority results in the weakening of state identity and ultimately the ability of the state to 
projects its ability to enforce laws and regulations within the state’s boundaries. The 
relationship between the government and the citizens that live under this structure 
continues to weaken. Eventually, the identity between the state and its citizens will 
disappear and result in citizens identifying themselves into smaller groups by religion or 
ethnicity within the previous state boundaries.  
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The social link between a state and its citizens is important but to establish this, a 
redistribution of government tax contribution to public services is needed to win back the 
support from a failing state. State failure usually exhibits tendencies of state government 
officials reaping the profits from tax collection, resource abuse, and external/internal 
bribery to the point that state functions cease to exist for the citizens and state resources 
that support state funded projects decline rapidly and become non-existent. The line 
between state government elites and the rest of the population becomes distinctly 
apparent at this time.  
Powerful public figures use their position to acquire private incomes from citizens 
that they govern, creating a predatory environment within the state. Elite groups that 
render the state ineffective have taken state resources and the citizens that make up the 
population below this social class divider become predatory in nature. As a result, the 
population solves problems that state institutions once were created to solve. The 
outcome of this divide increases the chances of state failure to occur. Public revenues 
cease to exist because the state’s citizens cannot afford to pay taxes, which also reveal 
that there are not any officials to collect these taxes because they cannot be paid. 
Internal groups become predatory in nature, as the elite groups strip any state resources 
that they can from the people. Bates highlights the importance of public revenues and 
how corruption within state infrastructure can lead to the degradation of public services. 
This can happen when public revenues cease to exist and governments cannot pay civil 
servants, further destabilizing state infrastructure.29 Overall state institutions represent the 
glue that binds the citizens to state governing forces, when these institutions or state 
officials fail to meet the needs of its citizens a social divide occurs resulting in the 
disintegration of state structure and identity. 
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Economic Development and the DRC 
One of the most essential environments that need to be nurtured and harvested 
for state development to come from the edges of failure is the economy. The state’s 
economy creates the fuel for a country’s growth and overall development. Internally and 
externally, a state needs to be able to maintain a strong and stable economy. In cases of 
Central African states and their ability to maintain a domestic/international economy, it is 
essential to not only their development, but their identity as a state within the global 
environment.  
The DRC and its list of problems are not different than the surrounding Central 
African nations. The government is plagued by corruption, natural resources are pillaged 
by invading forces and private industry, and its economic global footprint is almost non-
existent. As mentioned previously, state failure/collapse is not one problem but a list of 
negative factors that contribute to an overall disintegration of the state. 
 In the West’s attempt to reestablish state structure and economy, one of the 
failures that has been apparent over time, is the lack of attention external forces have to 
recognizing that policies that are instituted may not be effective at this level of decay in 
state institutions. This narrow perspective has led to a subjective view of the global 
economic environment while states such as, the DRC suffer at the West’s prosperity. 
Thomas points out that neoliberal policies and ideology have become the norm globally 
and have become a mirror example of social structure that does not translate to all levels 
of development/failure within the international environment: 
 The neoliberal ideology has thus come to be promoted around the globe as the proper 
approach to development. Neoliberalism supports global economic integration and presents it as 
the best, the most natural and the universal path towards economic growth, and therefore 
towards development, for all humanity. Critics, on the other hand, see its expansion across the 
globe as hegemonic.
30
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Furthermore, neoliberal policies have created social divides that make state structural 
development increasingly harder. Thomas explains that neoliberalism can increase 
social divisions by implementing policies that favor one part of the society over the other 
in a state failure environment.31 Despite this, neoliberalism does bring a certain amount 
of optimism if successfully implemented into state structures. With a promise of 
prosperity and growth of capitalism that neoliberalism can be successful if the 
environment and the state of development was at the right stages. If the factors are 
developed enough, such as economic and state infrastructure stability then capitalism 
may flourish in a structured and regulated environment.  
External institutions have adopted the neoliberal design and have tried to project 
this through institutions such as, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the World Bank. Yet, in my research I have noticed that this 
trend is not effective in creating strong economies for every state and in some cases 
may make matters worse in their development. In response to this, one size fits all 
approach, in the 1990s Central  African states were characterized as a total failure in 
their inability to develop stable and growing economies, often considered to be a 
hindrance on the stable international market.  
The DRC’s weakness to divert the path of economic growth away from imposed 
Western strategy has been in most accounts a failure. Bratton mentions the proposed 
weakness of African states to resist the power of external forces and their influence 
within the economy: 
 The state’s weakness in Africa derives from its subordination to stronger external 
institutions and, while the state has sponsored the formation of a bureaucratic class, it acts 
fundamentally as a collaborator on a project led by international capital. Internally, state elites 
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seek to monopolize economic activity and prevent the formation of social constellations with an 
independent base.
32  
The financial hold that external agencies or groups have on developing states within 
Africa has been quite substantial and has given external agencies such as the IMF and 
the World Bank the ability to influence and guide states, such as the DRC, in economic 
policies that have been in some cases detrimental to their overall development.  
The situation of failed economies and the attempt to develop them is simple if 
looked upon as a whole picture approach. It seems from the research already conducted 
for this thesis, that there is a gap in technology development and implementation. Failed 
states much like the DRC do not have the means or the ability to focus their society to 
meet the demands of the capitalist environment. The societies that are still using 
primitive means of agriculture technology in production and distribution of surplus cannot 
meet the demands of the growing international market. In their current state they would 
not be able to be competitive, which is essential to be successful or even stable in that 
environment. As a result of this deficiency, failing societies cannot accommodate an 
economic environment that would be needed to sustain a capitalist approach. It is 
obvious then that if a state cannot compete in the competitive economic environment of 
a capitalist structure it would not be successful in that environment. What makes it 
equally disappointing is that countries like the DRC are capable of sustaining themselves 
and in optimal conditions prosper beyond their current situation. With abundance of 
natural resources and a population needing economic stability the capability is there, but 
because of decades of abuse and corruption the state is left in disarray and debt. In 
response to this, government budgets have increased in the possible hope of entering 
the international economy and sustaining this type of momentum, taxing the population 
beyond their means. Additionally, moving needed resources away from production and 
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further hindering the local economy. This also reinforces an already predatory 
environment. 
The DRC exhibited many of the factors that other Central African states have 
experienced in economic growth. To add to the already mentioned list of negative 
economic factors, conflict plays a big role in the development of the current economic 
environment in the DRC. Micheal Nest highlights the difficulties of local industry 
possibilities as invading forces disrupt the opportunity of production and further 
investment of external private entities within the region.33 The amount of obstacles faced 
by external as well as internal private industry groups is inflated by the crumbling 
infrastructure, such as the legal system, that was heavily influenced by the highest 
bidder.  
External as well as internal entrepreneurs faced legal obstacles because 
government officials were easily bribed to make decisions. In many instances 
international private industry, non-governmental groups (NGOs), domestic private 
industry, and governmental groups had to meet the needs of governing forces that were 
separate from government regulations: 
 We realized that it is difficult to do business in the DRC, and that we could not compete on 
price---until our soldier friends in the Congolese army came back and said ‘supply us with 
uniforms, boots, food’…So we sent a container of rain jackets as a test---worth $50,000. When 
(the commander) saw that we could deliver before we had been paid, he accepted the shipment 
and paid in US dollars. So it was from that relationship that our business in the DRC began.
34
 
 To meet the many needs of the various groups that are present within the DRC, for 
business purposes, the ability to conduct legitimate business is almost impossible. It is 
hard to see how a mineral and resource rich country has come to this point from 
observing the current economic crisis at this time. So, it is necessary to look back to its 
independence and work forward. 
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The DRC since its rule with Mobutu has been a shell of a state. Mobutu and his 
elite cadre have pillaged much of the country’s accumulated wealth from natural 
resources and aid, leaving state institutions to crumble and not meet the needs of its 
people. At the end of the Cold War, the state was put into a period of shock when aid 
was stopped and a good source of the country’s income was not available. The country 
was already exhibiting signs of economic trouble in the 1980s, but in the 1990s it truly hit 
bottom and the country spiraled into chaos.  
President Kabila’s take over did not help in the development of the economy and 
in many respects made it worse. Kabila mortgaged half of the country’s mineral 
resources to allies to maintain stability, while the other half was confiscated by the 
invading forces in the region. Rotberg argues that Kabila’s ineptness added greatly to 
the demise of the DRC’s market: 
 What is beyond dispute is that in his three years in office, Luarent Kabila outdid Mobutu in 
taking his country into the abyss. Measured by the familiar yardsticks of the Mobutu dictatorship-
--extreme personalization of power and nepotism, corruption and rent seeking, neglect of public 
services, and indifference to the demands of the civil society---his performance is arguably even 
worse than that of his predecessor. Although Mobutu must bear full responsibility for sponsoring 
the failure of the state, Laurent Kabila’s ineptitude is what precipitated its dismemberment. 
Where Mobutu refused to share power while resisting the breakup of the state, Laurent Kabila 
‘preferred sharing the country to sharing power.
35
  
What seems to be an attempt to struggle to keep power and revive the market, Kabila 
continued to rent out resources and borrow from Western donors leaving the country in a 
state of client–patron relations with Western agencies and neighboring countries. As with 
many of the African states, the DRC was left handicapped to provide for itself. As a 
result the DRC was taken advantage of by neighboring states and acquire all potential 
sources of wealth. Additionally, these natural resources were also, pillaged by 
international companies that further degraded the ability of the state.  
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The local economy clearly became a predatory market and much of the state 
became a haven for illegal trafficking and selling of weapons, drugs, and various 
precious minerals. The external production within the country did not benefit the 
populace, but lined the pockets of elite groups and private industry seeking the abundant 
resources of the country. This being said, the country is not a unified economic structure, 
the addition of state building factors, such as state institutions that would be in place to 
regulate and protect against such acts, are not available. Economic development cannot 
be achieved without the establishment of regulation within the state.  
Western agencies, such as the IMF and the World Bank, tried to established 
policies that fit the needs of the global economy, but capitalist ideology would not work 
and has faced many obstacles for the DRC. Without a structure to work from, the 
country cannot regulate policies that are being implemented within the country. What is 
being done in the process of implementing these policies is that warlord politics comes 
into play: bribery, extortion, and the general abuse of the population at the expense of 
the few. As Herbst candidly points out, “With the global liberalization of finance have 
come sophisticated systems that allow African warlords, corrupt leaders, and others 
access capital”.36 This being said the current approach to solving state failure woe’s in 
the DRC is a failure in itself. 
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Chapter Three: DRC Historical Timeline 
 
The DRC is a mineral rich and healthy country in many respects, concerning 
natural resource abundance, it is also one of the largest countries in Africa, which has a 
robust population that is dispersed on the outer rims of the country and leaving the 
center barren of the general population. Yet, the DRC is in the midst of deconstruction of 
its state infrastructure and institutions from corrupt leadership, civil wars, and economic 
decline that has left the state in shambles. Herbst characterizes the condition of the DRC 
in terms of geological and infrastructure status as: 
 Democratic Republic of the Congo (the second largest---in terms of square kilometers---of 
the forty states south of the Sahara included in this book) is perhaps the classic case of an 
extremely challenging population distribution: the country has a large population density 
centered around Kinshasa and then other areas of high population scattered throughout its vast 
landmass, including one area of high population more than eight hundred miles away on the 
eastern border. In between are areas of extremely low population. D.R.O.C. is an almost classic 
instance of a ‘rimland’ country: the major population concentrations are found in its border 
regions while its interior is relatively empty. This particular distribution presents significant 
political problems because it makes constructing an infrastructure to support the extension of 
state power difficult, especially given the absolute size of the country, since there would have to 
be roads that went through vast areas that are relatively under populated. It is therefore no 
wonder that Kinshasa has had such an extraordinarily difficult time consolidating power and that 
many provinces have informally seceded.
37
  
Herbst depiction of the DRC is an after effect of decades of abuse and corruption that 
has plagued the country. How could a state with so many advantages in natural 
resources and a recent independence from colonial rule have failed in such a short 
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period of time? In the following chapters of this thesis I will outline the history of the DRC 
from its conception in 1885 until 2002 and use previous literature to elaborate on 
important points within the historical timeline of the DRC. The historical timeline will help 
to connect basic elements that are related to the factors of state failure in the DRC and 
connect these deconstructing factors to show how such a promising state came to be in 
this position. 
The Belgian Congo from 1885--1960 
The nation-state of the Congo was conceived in the hands of Belgium colonial 
control and under the banner of colonialism in 1885 as a possession of Leopold II, King 
of the Belgians. Pre-colonial governorship was completely eliminated after colonial rule 
was established. The Belgians maintained a European governing system that 
implemented an infrastructure that was not present in the history of the Congolese 
people. The infrastructure utilized the natural resources and pumped money into a 
prospering international economy that pushed forward the colonial machine that was so 
profitable for the Belgians.  
The Belgian colony created a robust system of transportation networks and state 
institutions to maintain control of its colony. The colonial system was a tool for the 
Belgians to oppress the Congolese for profit. During the colonial period, from 1885 to the 
late 1950s, the colonial state of the Belgium Congo was reborn and restructured to meet 
the needs of the colonial conquest.  Transportation routes and state institutions were 
built along the model of the European system of governance. The colonial system 
housed many Belgian civil service officials to fulfill the roles for leadership within the 
community, to better utilize the resources that were available, and to govern a society 
that was under the rule of the Belgium nation.  The region is a collection of natural 
resources that under a responsible governorship would deem the nation prosperous 
under many circumstances. 
31 
The Congo’s Independence 
In June of 1960, the Congo entered into the international system as an 
independent state, which in a rush to establish a new state identity was aggressively 
pushed by European nations to be formed as a democratic model of governorship. In a 
major shift of governance in the early-1960s, Belgium insisted that a democratic model 
be instituted in their absence.38 Free from the bonds of the Belgium government, the 
state had earned its independence from colonialism.  
The DRC was set at a disadvantage. The government that was funded and led 
by a European state was lacking in experienced leadership to fill the gap after the 
exodus of Europeans in 1960.  It is believed that colonialism stunted the growth and 
evolution of the nation-state in Africa. In comparison to European states that had 
centuries to develop, the African nation-states had a brief moment to make this 
evolutionary leap. As Reno alludes, the Congo was not different in this case: 
 Independence in June 1960 brought almost immediate violence as Congolese soldiers 
mutinied and Belgium paratroopers lent aid to the secessionist administration of mineral-rich 
Katanga. Ultimately, however, the battle appeared to be over the possibility of indigenous forces 
taking over the Western-dominated economy to redirect its formidable local resources toward 
developing a truly national industrial base. Couple with a reorientation of the Congo’s health, 
education and economic planning, independence provided opportunities to create a new cadre 
of Congolese technical specialist, educators, junior military officers and state officials.
39
  
The transition from being ruled in a colonial governing system to being independent was 
relatively fast. The people of the Congo were put into a position where they had to fill 
many governing stations with a population that had little experience in handling positions 
in government. They were not trained or educated to run a European governing system, 
such as the colonial government that preceded them.  By the time of independence the 
lack of an educated populace was apparent in the rate of graduates in 1960. As Reno 
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describes the country’s first university graduate received his degree in 1956. After the 
country became independent there were only 16 university graduates. 40 The need to 
build a strong infrastructure to replace the colonial government’s institutions and a 
growing intellectual base was apparent, but these and many needs for the newly 
established state could not be achieved by itself. 
During the period of 1958-1960 the colony of Belgium Congo was influenced by 
external events that helped shape the anti-colonial movement that was spreading 
through Africa after World War II. Callaghy points out that the Belgian government was 
not able to keep the country isolated from the independence movement. These external 
events that helped to shape the entrance of independence of the young Central African 
nation-state helped to form a rapid development of anti-colonial feeling within the region: 
Several external events helped to foster the late but rapid growth of a Congolese 
independence movement---Charles de Gaulle’s offer of independence to the French Congo in a 
speech in Brazzerville in late August 1958, the Brussels World’s Fair in the Fall of the same 
year, and the first pan-African conference organized by Kwame Nkrumah in Accra, Ghana, in 
December 1958 attended among others, Price Lumumba. These events were followed by bloody 
riots in Kinshasa (Leopoldville) on June 5, 1960, which accelerated both Belgian panic and the 
pace of events leading toward independence.
41
  
 After the independence of the Belgian Congo, the country was struggling with its 
inexperience to govern itself.  
The idea of politics and the model of government infrastructure were based on 
the Belgian colonial system of government. Political parties existed only in name prior to 
1960 and were quickly fragmented after independence. The competition for and the 
need for a governing structure took a toll on the stability of the nation. There needed to 
be order instilled into the region, but without the authority of the Belgium government the 
country quickly fell into chaos. The Belgium army mutinied against Belgian officers, 
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which resulted in the exodus of Belgian officials and residents from the region. Amidst 
the chaos and instability within the region a young enlisted soldier named Joseph Desire 
Mobutu took control.  
Mobutu and the New Congo: 1965-1997 
Mobutu wanted to create a new Congo, but had to eliminate remaining threats 
within the country. He did this by exiling, killing, or arresting any potential offenders. 
Mobutu was an ambitious and manipulative leader. He took the reins of the failing 
government in 1965, the former sergeant in the Belgium army was quickly appointed as 
Chief of staff in the Congolese National Army in 1960 under Prime Minister Lumumba. 
Like many before him that have had the opportunity to experience such power, he was 
ruthless in his ability to lead. This could only be obtained with help from external powers. 
Western aid helped to maintain Mobutu both militarily and financially. This was crucial in 
Mobutu’s stabilization of the state. The essence of his and the country’s survival was 
forged in the middle of the Cold War.  
The struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union helped to establish 
the state and keep Mobutu from allowing the Congo to spiral into state failure. With the 
help of the United States, Mobutu expelled the Soviet Union; in response to this the U.S. 
gave a considerable amount of military aid and financial backing during these early 
years. Through this assistance Mobutu established a significant and loyal military wing to 
secure his power. As with many of the African states during the postcolonial period 
external assistance was crucial and almost detrimental in its evolution since the state 
received its freedom from colonialism. The 1960’s and 1970’s were highly vulnerable for 
post-colonial states; Western country’s exerted influence with foreign aid. 42  The 
reinforcement of Western donors helped to bolster the reign of Mobutu and allow his 
regime to last for many decades longer than it should have. 
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In the early 1971 Mobutu changed the name of the country from the Congo to 
Zaire. As possibly a means to unify the country and its people in a nationalistic effort, 
much like controlling the social communication network and promotion of identity as a 
leader, Mobutu created an image of a growing and unifying country that was coming out 
of the grasp of European control. Despite these efforts the infrastructure and the people 
were suffering at the hands of their leadership.  Although not originally intended to be 
sustainable past Zaire’s independence, Mobutu utilized the already established colonial 
state structure and minimized his restructuring of the state institutions to ensure greater 
financial gain from international and domestic resources.  
With the combination of foreign aid and the already established state 
infrastructure, Mobutu had the appearance of a functioning and developing state. 
Callaghy highlights Mobutu’s plan during the post-colonial period this way, “Thus we can 
see that Mobutu’s strategy of state formation entails recentralization and personalization 
of power and the resurrection of the colonial state in structure and spirit although 
shrouded in revolutionary language and mobilization rhetoric”.43   Additionally, he started 
to create a nationalistic rhetoric that would establish him and the nation for the decades 
to follow.  
In early 1973, Mobutu directly controlled all media, sports, and religious events.44 
Mobutu also took control of religious publications and press releases. In 1974, he went 
further and established sites that were historically marked from Mobutu’s life, mostly 
from his home region, which was commonly referred to as Bethlehem or the Holy land.45  
As Mobutu established himself and his proclaimed state structure he did so in a manner 
that is a direct reflection of authoritarian leadership.  
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With the backing from the West, the infrastructure that was already put in place 
by the previous Belgium colonial system, and the establishment of elites that were to aid 
him in his rule, Mobutu created the appearance of a flourishing state. Nevertheless, the 
appearance was just that, he kept his power centralized around himself and his political 
elites while eliminating competition by creating a political environment that was held 
together by secrets and assassinations of those who posed a threat to his power. 
Callaghy comments on Mobutu’s perspective of holding power in Zaire, “…President 
Mobutu explained what the term ‘man of State’ [home d’état] meant to him: ‘A man of 
State is one who knows how to keep secrets. If we decide today to kill someone for 
reasons of State [des raisons d’état], it must remain between us”.46 Mobutu used his 
leverage to gain influence and monetary wealth at the expense of his people.  
The Cold War was a key factor in Mobutu’s staying in power for such a long 
period of time. Furthermore, his ability to rent out the natural resources to external 
private and state companies ultimately led his country down decades of patron/client 
relationships that they did not know of at the time, but would haunt them for years to 
come. Rotberg explains Mobutu’s strategy in dealing with external aid and maintaining a 
crumbling state infrastructure: 
Mobutu used analogous tactics in the patrimony of Zaire. As his people’s self-proclaimed 
guide, or as the personalist embodiment of national leadership during the Cold War, he deployed 
the largesse of his American and other western patrons to enhance his personal wealth, to 
heighten his stature over his countrymen, and to weave a tightly manipulated web of loyalties 
across the army and into all aspects of Zairese society. Every proper political and democratic 
institution was an obstacle to the edifice that he created. So was civil society, politics itself in the 
broad sense, and economic development. Letting the country’s Belgian-built infrastructure rot, 
maintaining a colonial type of resource extraction (of copper, other metals, and diamonds), 
rebuffing the rise of a real bourgeoisie, and feeding his people false glories instead of real 
substance and per capita growth accentuated his own power, wealth, and importance. As with 
Stevens and Sia Barre, the modernizing state was the enemy. Mobutu had no sense of noblesse 
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oblige. Rene Lemarchand says that for Mobutu’s state, patronage was the indispensable 
lubricant. Ultimately, however, ‘the lubricant ran out and the Mobutist machine was brought to a 
…standstill…The inability of the Mobutist state to generate a volume of rewards consistent with 
its clientelistic ambitions is the key….[to]….its rapid loss of legitimacy.
47
  
 Mobutu continued to abuse his people and the state’s natural resources through the 
1970s and the effects started to become apparent in 1980s as Zaire started to show 
strains in its economic stability. Rotberg further alludes to the amount of abuse and 
corruption Mobutu allowed in Zaire: 
 Mobutu’s kleptocratic rule extracted the marrow of Zaire and left nothing for the mass of 
his national dependents. Much of the resource wealth of the vast country ended up on his or his 
cronies’ pockets; …….. hardly any wealth was devoted to uplifting the Congolese people, 
improving their welfare, building infrastructures, or even providing more than rudimentary 
amounts of human security. Mobutu’s government performed only for Mobutu…
48
  
 It became clear, maybe more in hindsight, that Zaire’s success was really Mobutu’s 
success. What I mean by this is that since his rise to power he created a façade that 
served himself, Western powers, and his elite cadre, but no one else. He used the 
already established and already crumbling colonial infrastructure as his base. This 
governing structure was originally supported by the Belgian government, but since the 
country’s independence it could not be maintained to the standard that it was previously 
held up to.  
In the initial years of the newly established state, Zaire had the full support of 
Western powers in their fight against the Soviet Union. As will be seen later on in this 
thesis this does not last. The crutch that was created for maintaining Mobutu’s regime 
will eventually be eliminated in the coming decades. Additionally, natural resources, 
such as precious metals, were being rented to state and non-state organizations that 
stripped the country of its ability to sustain itself, what is appropriately labeled as a 
version of the “resource curse”. The combination of these events helped to amass a 
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fortune for Mobutu and his political elite, which were at the direct expense of his country 
and its people. 
The 1980s were considered by most scholars as a period of time that the Mobutu 
regimes were living off of the success of his corruption. In the beginning of Zaire’s 
formation Mobutu was not considered corrupt. There seemed to be an attempt at least at 
a state formation, but the international community did not see him as a threat or realize 
what he would have done during his reign. It was not apparent during the beginning of 
the 1980s that economic failure for Zaire was on the horizon. The regime was still 
renting out its natural resources and collecting heavily from Western powers during the 
Cold War. In this context, Mobutu was not threatened by economic destabilization. As 
Van de Walle points out, authoritarian leaders that are not threatened by the occurrence 
of economic failure may not feel the need to change. Zaire’s economic disaster during 
the 1980s revealed that these events did not affect the power and privilege of Mobutu 
and his elite cadre.49 The appearance of a stable and prospering economy was not to 
last, the disintegration of the country’s economy would eventually catch up with Mobutu, 
and the state structure would move forward toward state failure. Herbst makes a clear 
reflection of Mobutu’s leadership by describing how Mobutu was able to stay in power, 
despite an enormous economic decline in Zaire, which was due to the lack of robust 
productivity within the country. 50 In light of this, corruption and the lack of development 
characterized Zaire as an example of a corrupt state by its inability to maintain rapid 
structural growth within its so called development.51 Reno highlights the demise of the 
Mobutu image in the 1980s by comparing him in the 1970s as a progressive leader to 
his image as a corrupt leader responsible for the decline of his state. 52  From its 
conception the state of Zaire started out toward democracy, saw the rise of a promising 
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leader in Mobutu, started toward a downward spiral as he and his administration abused 
the power that was given to them, rented out natural resources, and heavily depended 
on external aid for self-survival. In the midst of all this, the Mobutu regime took a majority 
of the profits, which ultimately left the country penniless and helpless as it slipped into 
state failure.  
The 1990s marked a major transition for Zaire as the end of the Cold War 
surprised the world and was considered a victory for the West. Transitioning from the 
tension felt by the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, there was a 
sense of change and hope for a better future in the international community. Despite 
this, the end of the Cold War had devastating effects for Zaire and Mobutu’s hold on the 
country. As Reno points out Mobutu and Zaire’s political usefulness to the West stopped 
and the flow of financial assistance and aid ceased to exist for the Central African nation. 
As a result of the absence of aid, non-governmental agencies and private donors have 
replaced the aid for public services that were formerly funded by this assistance.53 State 
infrastructure and institutions were barely functioning or not apparent at this point of 
time.  
The years of abuse and corruption had stripped the country of its ability to be 
actively self-sufficient. Following the end of Western aid, the state began to rapidly fall 
into a cycle of decay. In an attempt to reestablish his control over the country and regain 
international assistance from the West, Mobutu made a move toward democratic 
transition in 1990. This transition marked the end of the proclaimed second Republic, 
which lasted from 1965-1990.54 He was able to hold on to a diminishing image as the 
leader of Zaire until the 1990s, but was showing signs of an obvious loss of power. 
Nzongola-Ntalaja highlight’s this transition of leadership, “On August 4 1992, the 
overwhelming majority of the 2,842 delegates at the Congolese Sovereign National 
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Conference in Kinshasa voted, by acclamation and standing ovation, to change the 
name of the country to ‘Zaire’ back to its original name of ‘Congo’”.55 A set of events 
eventually led to the complete removal of Mobutu and his political elite from its 
governmental functions as the leadership for Zaire.  
The first was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, which acted as a catalyst for 
neighboring countries to remove Mobutu from power. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda 
started the political upheaval in Zaire as refugees fled the terrible events that took place 
in Rwanda and invaded the state boundaries of the neighboring Zaire. 56 As an apparent 
problem with failing states is the migration of the state’s citizens from conflict areas, 
which can be a heavy burden on that particular neighboring country(s). The massive 
migration of refugees, equaling up to 1 million people, brought also armed invasions of 
Eastern provinces along Zaire’s borders. In addition to this, the massive inflow of 
refugees also brought disease, such as Ebola and Polio epidemics that had not been 
seen in those regions before. 57 The mass migration from Rwanda opened the doors for 
neighboring states to take the advantage of access to Zaire and help aid the removal of 
Mobutu. As Herbst alludes to this in this passage, Mubutu’s control of Zaire was slipping 
out of his hands: 
 …Mobutu was recognized as the ruler of Zaire even though he controlled little more than 
Kinshasa and its environs for the last years of his rule and continued to be recognized as the 
leader while the forces of Luarent Kabila marched through the country in late 1996 and early 
1997. Kabila was only recognized as the legitimate ruler when he captured Kinshasa on 17 May 
1997.
58
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The emerging leader Luarent Kabila was taking control of Zaire and merged forces with 
the Rwandan army, which crossed the Zairian border in 1996 allowing for the removal of 
Mobutu from power and the eventual disintegration of the former state of Zaire.59  
President Kabila’s Takeover and the Recognition of the DRC: 1997-Present 
With this, Kabila became the leader of the former state of Zaire and what would 
become known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 17 May 1997. 
Kabila’s march through Zaire was mostly unchallenged by Mobutu forces.60 It is important 
to point out that the final death blow to Mobutu’s hold on the Zairian state was directly 
related to the Rwandan army’s pursuit of refugee camps in Kivu. Nzongola-Ntalaja 
alludes to the transition of power in the DRC, “Mobutu’s fall and Luarent-Desire Kabila’s 
rise to power in Kinshasa were direct consequences of the RPF drive to destroy the 
UNHCR refugee camps in Kivu, together with the support that the ex-FAR and the 
HUTU extremist militia were receiving from the Mobutu regime”. 61  The new DRC 
President Kabila was a known revolutionary and clearly at this point a bright light in the 
darkness that Mobutu had created for the region.  
Kabila had a revolutionary history with his participation in guerilla wars in the 
Congo in 1960 to 1985. He was a known resistance leader during the 1960 to 1963 
Katanga secession and in command of the Eastern wing of the popular insurrections in 
1964 and 1966. Additionally, he was the president of the Parti Revolutionnaire du People 
(PRP) 1967 to 1985.62  After the capture of Kinshasa, Kabila was recognized as the 
president of the DRC. Herbst marks this transition of power: 
 For instance, Mobutu Sese Seko was recognized as the ruler of Zaire even though he 
controlled little more than Kinshasa and its environs for the last years of his rule; he continued to 
be recognized as the leader while the forces of Luarent Kabila marched through the country in 
late 1996 and early 1997. Kabila was only recognized as the legitimate ruler when he captured 
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Kinshasa on 17 may 1997. International legal practice is inadequate for understanding the actual 
forces on the ground because it is almost always the case (Somalia is the major exception) that 
some force can claim control of the the capital.
63
  
 In an anti-climactic ending for Mobutu, Trefon notes his final demise as he died in exile 
on 7 September, 1997, only four months after being exiled from the DRC. 64 Despite the 
success and the eventual death of Mobutu, troubles continued to plague the country. 
The mixed blessing of the assistance of Rwanda and eventually Uganda in the 
ousting of Mobutu from power in Kinshasa came at an extended price in the form of their 
armies continuing their stay in the region and trying to exert control. Herbst notes that 
the influence of Uganda and Rwanda was not just the removal of Mobutu, but a form of 
influence on the developing country’s actions: 
 In 1998, Rwanda and Uganda decided to try to oust Laurent Kabila and replace him with a 
more manageable puppet in order to have their security concerns addressed. They did not try to 
simply seize territory in eastern D.R.O.C. and declare that their states had grown, even though 
this would have been far easier than replacing the government in far-away Kinshasa.
65
  
 Kabila had new adversaries to face and the remaining armies from these countries 
posed a problem to his continued control of the region. The two countries wanted to 
maintain control of occupied areas of the DRC. Their presence would further destabilize 
the country and influence its direction. Facing an uphill battle to maintain control, this left 
a wake of destruction that continued into the turn of the century. Rotberg points out that 
the death sited by the International Rescue Committee since 1998 maybe possibly as 
high as 3 million deaths. 66  The DRC continues to fight an uphill battle in the new 
millennia. 
In early 2001 the President, Laurent Kabila was murdered by his own body 
guard. The country was in an economic crisis, considered a failed state; its natural 
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resources have been pillaged either by occupying forces or the Mobutu legacy of 
patron/client relationships from the country’s natural resources. Filip notes that the 
international community views the DRC as one of the biggest examples of a resource 
rich country becoming a geological scandal. The DRC could fund its own development, 
but is unable to maintain the wealth that could be attributed to its vast mineral 
resources.67  
In 2002, the DRC was considered a failed state on every level: conflict, economic 
decline, crumbling infrastructure, transparent borders, lawlessness, and the lack of 
public services were rampant in the country. Many scholarly perspectives viewed the 
DRC as in a state of failure and in some cases a perfect example of what state failure 
would look like in the international system. Furthermore, the country had become a 
staging ground for conflict of several other countries in Central Africa in 2002. 68 
Nzongola-Ntalaja further describes the descent of the country, “…more than 3 million 
Congolese died between August 1998 and November 2002 of war-related causes such 
as malnutrition, lack of health care and dangerous living conditions in areas where 
refuge has been sought in the bush”. 69 The country is in total state of decline. The 
possibilities that would be evident in its development have been given, taken, or 
dissolved in the past decades. 
DRC in the Present: A Look from the Outside In 
According to the CIA World Fact book for 2012, in October of 2002, Joseph 
Kabila, the son of the late President, was elected the new President following his father’s 
assassination. He was successful in negotiating a withdrawal of Rwandan forces from 
the Eastern region of the DRC. By the end of 2002, Kabila was successful in pushing 
forth the Pretoria Act, which had all warring parties cease fighting and promote national 
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unity within the country. Following the relative peace in mid-2003, the transitional 
government was established. By the end of 2005, a constitutional referendum was 
created and in 2006 the first successful elections were conducted. In a somewhat 
disputed election, Kabila was reelected to office.70  
According to statistics gathered from the World Bank and the United Nations 
Statistics Division a list of indicators showed the progression or regression of the 
development of the DRC since the end of the Cold War. The World Bank reported that in 
2006 the population that was living below poverty line was 27%. In addition to this, the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for 2011 was $15.65 billion (US dollars). The DRC has 
shown an increase of growth from 1993 which was at -13.5 % of growth per year to 6.9 
% of growth in 2012. Even though the DRC shows signs of growth the country still holds 
a low income level rating. The net taxes on products starting at 1993 revealed that the 
DRC issued $85,662,336 to a reduction of $677, 476,307 in 2011. 71 
The CPIA Building Human Resources collected data that showed an increase in 
human resource development within the country. CPIA used a spectrum gauging the 
countries growth from 1-6 (1 being the lowest and 6 being the highest). In 2006, the level 
was at 3, but increased to 3.5 by 2011. The net official development and aid received in 
1993 was $177,820,000 but had dropped to $3,542,980,000 in 2010. This revealed a 
significant drop in aid and development assistance to the country since the early 1990s. 
The economic breakdown between male/female workers within the country, as reported 
by the UN Statistics Division revealed that during 2011 70% of women were employed in 
the current work force compared 73% of men.72  
 According to the World Bank, in 2011 the life expectancy of a person was 48 
years old. In addition to this, the UN Statistics Division reported that the percentage of 
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the population that had HIV/AIDS was between 380,000 to 490,000 people during 2009. 
Furthermore, the amount of citizens that have secondary education in the country was at 
36% in 2010. The ability to gauge the progress of the DRC since the end of the Cold 
War or since its conception in the 1960s is limited.73 
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Chapter Four: DRC and State Failure 
 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has experienced many obstacles 
since its founding. Since its independence the DRC has had a corrupt and ruinous 
leadership, unstable economy, internal conflict, degradation of infrastructure and 
institutions, and the lack of basic facilities for its people. The combination of these 
factors has left a devastating effect on the country as a whole and at present the DRC is 
considered a failed state. State failure is a diagnosis by the international community as a 
sickness of the state. Much like a patient in terminal care, its vital organs are failing and 
the body is struggling to survive.  
Three Key Factor Attributed to State Failure in the DRC 
There are three key factors that a failed state needs to strengthen if it hopes to 
regain a status of identity within the international community and with its own citizens 
within its borders. Additionally, these three indicators can be used to gauge the level of 
failure within the state. By using these indicators this thesis will be focused on explaining 
how state failure occurred in the DRC.  
The DRC is in need of a reconstruction of basic infrastructural institutions so that 
the needs of its people can be met and regulated preventing corruption from interrupting 
the basic services that its citizens need to survive on a daily basis. The importance of 
this cannot be stressed enough and whatever comes after this fact is an evolution in the 
DRC’s governmental status, but as a beginning point state institutions need to be put in 
place for the dispersal of funds from both internal and external donors. Institutions bring 
the ability to apply state intervention to meet the needs of the people and provide an 
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outlet for the government and its people to have a meeting point to resolve issues that 
are plaguing the country. Currently, these institutions have degraded to a point that they 
are non-functional or if they are operational are corrupt to a level that is not effective in 
allowing the governmental structure (state institutions) to connect to the populace 
anymore. To re-establish this connection would bring back a flow of communication and 
means to improve the state’s condition, and benefit its people.  
The economy needs to be stabilized to help revive the domestic and the 
international economy. The DRC is rich in natural resources, but without the help of a 
state to regulate such an economy from illegal activities the chances of the DRC ever 
successfully entering into the international economy as a whole are not very good. Also, 
the country faces many issues of debt that is owed and obligations from private lenders 
for their natural resource wealth, not to mention neighboring state presence that 
threatens the stability of the state. Even though it has been documented that in the 
absence of a regulated domestic economy a secondary, illegal economic market 
(domestic black market) springs up to meet the needs of the people, the need for a 
formal economy is essential to allow for future entrance to the international realm. 
Regulations of laws to prohibit criminal actions are essential and institutions to 
guide/make these laws would be needed. In many ways this is the fuel for growth of the 
state. Without a strong economy the attributes and sections of the state will wither and 
die. So, the importance of this phase of development cannot be understated.  
The appearance and action of external intervention within the DRC involved a 
multitude of actors that influence the development of the country. Non-State actors, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other private institutions provide basic 
services to a country that is experiencing signs of failure or who are in a phase of state 
collapse. In the case of the DRC, NGOs have provided much needed supplies and aid to 
the people, but to take a look at the whole picture this may have been more detrimental 
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of an approach than to actually aiding a failing nation. Additionally, private institutions 
have lent money and aid at a price that the state and its people will be paying for 
decades to come in the form of patron/client relationships. The entrance of non-state 
entities in the DRC has left the country and its people vulnerable to outside influence 
and has weakened the state’s borders. As a result, occupying foreign forces has 
weakened the identity of the state.  
The DRC has had a combination of these factors due to the decades of 
corruption and abuse from its leadership. The proceeding sections of this thesis will 
highlight these three areas of weakness in the DRC and will use historical examples to 
illustrate why the country has come to this point. Furthermore, in a pursuit of a better 
understanding of state failure within the DRC, the use of the previously listed indicators 
will show how such a phenomenon came about. Through this approach, I will hope to 
answer the question of why state-failure has occurred in the DRC. Additionally, I hope to 
highlight the many factors and the changes in the external environment that have led the 
country to its current failing condition at this time. 
State Infrastructure 
            The first factor that contributed to state failure in the DRC is its state 
infrastructure. In the post-colonial state of the Belgian Congo, the military acted as a 
major interdicting force in political affairs by securing the political elite into governing 
positions within the Congo after its formation. The result of this is the creation of an 
aristocratic political class that instilled its influence and economic threshold into their 
relationship with the state itself. The welfare and policies generated toward the citizens 
of the Congo was not a priority for the political aristocracy during this period. As a result, 
resource distribution and public services began to suffer from this new power shift. After 
Mobutu’s take over and conversion from the Congo to the Zairian state, according to 
Callaghy the acting military began the abuse of power towards it citizens: 
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The Zairian military constantly abuses the subject population in a whole host of ways: theft, 
extortation, and armed robbery of all kinds; arbitrary arrest; illegal fines; setting up unauthorized 
barricades; kidnappings; beatings; rapes; forced labor; harassment of businessmen; physical 
attacks and extortion in village open-air markets; scavenging and pillage of crops, fruit, goats, and 
chickens; attacks on missions; and even fishing with dynamite, which destroys local fishing 
grounds. The local populations view of the military as a foreign conquering force.
74
  
The positioning of the political elites and the residing leadership of Mobutu in the 
Zairian state developed into an environment that would breed corruption and 
widespread abuse of state institutions. The decades of corruption and the lack of 
continued strengthening of the state’s infrastructure led to the decay of state 
institutions put in place to maintain the well-being of the populace. 
Corruption and Abuse: the Destabilization of State Institutions 
The destabilization of the Zairian state institutions was the result of years 
of abuse. The amount of dependency put on the colonial infrastructure was not 
originally meant to be put to use this way. As a result, critical state institutions 
that were vital for the well-being of the citizens of Zaire were failing. State 
institutions, such as public health, transportation infrastructure, public education, 
and regulatory systems were deteriorating.  
The future of the professional workforce within the region looked bleak, as 
governmental services were deteriorating. Due to civil wars and conflicts within 
the country, professionals such as doctors, teachers and citizens that had the 
resources for mobility left the country. As a result, replacing this professional 
working class is not an easy task. Educational opportunities and the ability for 
citizens to achieve a level of education needed to fill these roles are not very 
realistic in a war torn country.75 The reaction to this by Mobutu and his political 
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cadre was to rely on patronage networks and aid donations to sustain critical 
political nodes within the state infrastructure.  
Despite this, a majority of the donor aid was received by the governing 
forces and did not directly benefit the populace as it was originally intended. As 
Reno points out, Mobutu used the patron/client relationship between outside 
donors to keep his regime stable by utilizing these funds as means of sustaining 
substance for Zaire: 
 By the mid-1980s it appeared as though state institutions in Congo were experiencing a 
total collapse. But it also became apparent that Mobutu and his associates had found a new 
strategy for staying in power, even as formal institutions of their government withered. Much of 
the information about the parameters of this strategy emerged in the ‘where did this money go’ 
stories and analyses.
76
  
As a result, the country amassed a large national debt during the 1980s, which 
threatened the countries stability of critical institutions within the states infrastructure. 
Yet, Mobutu’s use of the patron/client relationship between the Zairian state and foreign 
donors acted as a means to keep the Mobutu regime stable for the time being. Mobutu 
was able to utilize patron/client relationships as a means to maintain public services. By 
renting out precious state resources to external entities Mobutu was able to maintain the 
crumbling state institutions.77  
When famine and natural disaster hit the region in the mid-1980s, the Zairian 
state institutional structure failed to respond to such crisis, because of lack of resources 
and a decaying infrastructure to support them. The occurrence of natural disasters and 
the weight of the debt load on the country restricted many services that were needed for 
the general populace. As a result, famine and starvation were at record levels during the 
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mid-1980’s.The inability of the Mobutu government to provide these basic services to his 
people caused an increase in political instability.78  
The domestic market also suffered from a lack of regulatory systems and the 
enforcement of trade laws as such institution failed to emanate the power needed to 
create a presence within state borders. Nest alludes to the obstacles business 
entrepreneurs faced while conducting business in the DRC, “The weak legal system in 
the DRC made it almost impossible for entrepreneurs to ensure that their agreements 
with Congolese counterparts were enforced.”79In addition to the decaying infrastructure, 
transportation systems began to fail from lack of maintance due to resource distribution 
within the state.  
Critical transportation nodes, such as river boat and road networks were not 
maintained by the mid-1990.80 The eventual decay of state institutions was the result of 
decades of abuse and corruption from the political elite class and the Mobutu regime. 
The funneling of money from donor recipients to the state resulted in the aristocracy as 
well as the Mobutu regime collecting large amounts of aid, while the rest of the populace 
suffered as a result.  
In response to state institutions and their inability to manage problems between 
the state and its citizens, private organizations filled the gap. The continuation and the 
eventual evolution of private organizations took root in the public hemisphere in reaction 
to public need. In this political environment the Mobutu regime took advantage of the 
resources that became available by allowing private sector businesses to conduct their 
operations within the state boundaries. According to Reno, the commercialization of 
political control within Zaire was utilized to manipulate economic reform programs 
granted by Western donors. Mobutu’s access to aid and the manipulation of these 
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programs gave him the ability to utilize Western resources that were needed for his 
country and increase his political authority.81  
Public civil service employees were replaced by private industry, not only adding 
to a growing unemployment situation within Zaire, but replacing essential free public 
services with private sector industry that citizens struggled to pay for. In response to this, 
public service workers were pushed out of their position as private industry moved in and 
took vital resources that the Mobutu government provided to them, leaving the public 
sector with virtually nothing to work with. 82  
Toward the end of the Mobutu regime’s rule, state institutions that used to 
provide basic services to and for the citizens of the Zaire were capitalized by private 
industry. This is due to the corrupted nature of the governing forces within the country 
and the allowance of private sector organizations to take the place of these failing 
institutions. As a result, private industry created an environment that services were paid 
by the citizens and added a heavy burden on an already shaky societal foundation. 
Rotberg describes the predatory nature of Zaire at the end of the Mobutu rule: 
 Bad policies can lead to the failure of the state, until the state ceases to provide virtually 
any public goods, and state agents become almost entirely predatory. Zaire at the end of the 
Mobutu Sese Seko regime is probably exemplary. By the late 1980s, the state had stopped 
providing official funding for and social services, though many of them continued to be provided 
on a fee-for-service basis, effectively privatized by state agents.
83
  
By the end of Mobutu’s reign Zaire had lost its ability to maintain itself as a state and 
resorted to private sector services to provide services that the rest of the population 
could scarcely afford. 
Also, in response to the failing state infrastructure was the presence of non-
governmental agencies (NGOs) in their attempts to fill gaps within the state. This can be 
a mixed blessing in terms of states that are exhibiting signs of failure, while it is critical to 
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meet the basic needs of the people in a time of crisis or hardship it is also essential to 
meet these needs in a way that is constructive in terms of allowing the state’s 
infrastructure to create an environment to help heal itself.  
What happens when states depend on external services such as private 
institutions and support from NGOs is that the society that is being aided tends to rely on 
these aid organizations rather than building a stable and trusting relationship with their 
own government. As a result, this tends to breakdown the societal structure that the 
NGO presence is ultimately trying to build up. The dependence on funding from external 
aid groups divides society and government forces, undermining the relationship between 
the state and its citizens.84 As a result, grassroots groups emerge and fill small roles 
within the state often in small areas and not really addressing the problem as a whole 
and the inclusion of governmental officials is limited due to the nature of these 
relationships. According to Ferguson, “…swarms of new ‘nongovernmental 
organizations’ (NGOs) have arisen, taking advantage of the shift in donor policies that 
moved funding for projects away from mistrusted state bureaucracies and into what were 
understood as more ‘direct’ or ‘grassroots’ channels of implementation.”85  
The result of NGO activity and what ultimately becomes a grassroots 
organization is that they achieve a type of patchwork methodology for dealing with 
problems plaguing the state. Their inability to successfully create a relationship with the 
state leadership results in a non-constructive nature that ultimately leaves the problem 
unresolved or only resolved in certain areas of the state as long as the NGO is present. 
The failure in their approach or methodology to solve problems within a failed state, such 
as Zaire, is not solely on NGO’s, but is equally connected to the demands of the host 
nation.  
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In contrast to private organizations and their ability to function in place of state 
institutions is the result of their relationship with the state government and their ability to 
bribe or give additional aid to the governing forces that NGOs may not be able to abide 
by. The DRC unfortunately relied heavily on external support for a majority of its ability to 
function as a state. With the support from the West during the Cold War to the ushering 
in of private industry and NGO groups the state essentially relied on external support for 
its own well-being while the governing forces reaped the rewards from this relationship. 
An important element within state infrastructure development is the relationship 
between the government and its people. After the establishment of the Zairian state 
(DRC after Mobutu’s removal) Mobutu was quick to establish a nationalist state with him 
at the center of it. That relationship was established by removing threatening symbols of 
influence that may challenge his authority. According to Callaghy: 
 In 1972 regional officials suppressed a private (i.e., nonstate, nonchurch) school because 
it was not official recognized. Also in 1972, regional officials had to implement Mobutu’s decision 
abolishing all church youth organizations and incorporating them into JMPR. All other church or 
religious organizations must be officially recognized and registered. Regional officials have 
trouble coping with the many new religious sects or churches that crop up.
86
  
Mobutu viewed the church as a threatening symbol that could act as an opposition to his 
power and steer the citizen population away from his favor. Furthermore, the church was 
not recognized by the state and Mobutu tried to make the church an illegitimate entity 
within Zaire. Mobutu moved to sever the international connection that the church brought 
into Zaire, viewing the church as a legitimate threat to sovereignty of the country and his 
power as leader.87 Mobutu responded to the church by completely disenfranchising the 
institution from the state and its people. In response, Mobutu created Mobutuism as the 
official religious doctrine and declared holidays, such as Christmas as not legitimate.  
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The effects of Mobutu’s creation of a nationalistic stance in the 1960’s and 
1970’s made for a strong image of unity within the initial decades of Zaire’s 
independence. Despite this, these decades also represented signs of a gross abuse of 
power that would not only effect the health and stability of the state, but the relationship 
the state had with its people. As mentioned previously, Zaire relied heavily on foreign aid 
from a multitude of sources to meet its needs and many of these aid functions never met 
the general populace, which created a gap between state governing agencies and the 
people they are purportedly supposed to be serving. This inability to meet the needs of 
the people and the elimination of state and non-state groups within the state to help 
establish the link between the two factions was eliminated due to a possible threat to 
Mobutu’s regime. This can be seen in Mobutu’s confrontation with the church in the early 
years of the countries creation. This identity gap has created the need of an essential 
factor in the stabilization of Zaire as a state. Its loss of identity not only makes it 
unrecognizable as a state to its citizens but weakens its chances of being recognized as 
a strong state to the international community. 
After state failure occurred in the 1990s local law enforcement and state 
institutions were unable to regulate such activity. This inability to enforce law within the 
state has great ramification on the creation or stabilization of other institutions that aid 
the strengthening of the state itself, such as economic conditions and criminal activity. 
The ability to create law and order within the region is vital in establishing what can be 
expected from the government. The effects of Mobutu and elite cadre cannot be 
underestimated in the overall outcome of Zaire. State failure occurred because of the 
loss of state identity between the government and its people. This happened because 
the governing forces eliminated all opposition to them and replaced it with a nationalistic 
element, then grossly misused its resources and utilized external elements for their own 
personal gain rather than the building of their state. 
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Democratization and Western Influence 
The push for democratization by the West and need to implement public services 
were severely lacking in Zaire. Over the following decades the citizens of Zaire had lost 
hope and a sense of identity with the state. Trefon alludes to the citizens general attitude 
to the proposed changes, “Congolese in general and Kinois in particular had lost hope in 
Mobutuism and were frustrated by the fiction of democratic transition. In response to this 
situation, they were forced to invent new solutions based primarily on friendship, trade 
and profession, neighborhood ties and religious affiliation.”88 An alternate form of solution 
had to be formed to meet the needs of the people. This generally took the form of black 
markets or trade between professions. 
The outlook for graduating college students was bleak, but the college diploma 
was often looked upon as a sense of entitlement to a noble status. In the early-1990s 
students faced the reality that a college degree will not always equal employment. 
Moreover, this was severely marginalized by the deteriorating condition of the state. No 
longer do these qualifications constitute an automatic stature within the society. The 
increase in unemployment, the downsizing of state institutions and their effectiveness 
within the population of Zaire, became a deteriorating factor which helped to lead to the 
eventual failure of the state in the 1990s.  
Under these condition and much like many other failing states, the exodus of 
trained professionals to fill key essential roles within the state were left vacant by what 
many researchers have termed the “brain drain” effect. Under these conditions and the 
lack of trained professionals to help develop Zaire, ultimately led the country toward a 
crisis. 
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Conclusion 
The state infrastructure of Zaire met all the requirements for state failure. The 
exodus of professionals from the region due to unemployment, shrinking of government 
institutions that were eventually replaced by private sector organizations, the inclusion of 
NGOs within the country in forms of grassroots groups (further delegitimizing the state), 
the loss of identity between the state and its people, and the inability to project power 
and promote the rule of law within the state boundaries. The obvious answer to correct 
such problems would be to reverse these issues, but the ability to attack these issues 
also opens a Pandora’s Box, which includes factors such as private interest groups and 
corruption on all levels of society. State institutions are the one form of government that 
connects and addresses the needs of the people to the ruling government. By not taking 
an active stance in trying to establish, strengthen, and promote these institutions under a 
rule of law the identity of the state and the legitimacy of the state are severely in 
question. The second factor that allowed state failure to occur in the DRC is the lack of 
economic development. 
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Chapter Five: Economic Development 
 
During the initial decades of independence in Zaire, the country was considered 
to be in the midst of economic development and in relative good standing. Zaire is 
mineral rich and the abundance of other natural resources revealed a prosperous future 
for the newly established country. In the height of the 1960s and 1970s the abundance 
of this wealth also brought corruption, which originated within the political aristocracy.  
The economic environment in the mid to late 1970s started to reveal the strain on 
the economic structure within Zaire. The lack of production and the amount of external 
private involvement in state industry that was detrimentally affecting the ability of the 
state to generate its own positive growth. Callaghy comments on the economic 
condition: 
The financial condition of the Zairian absolutist state in the late 1960s and early 1970s was 
excellent, particularly because of the high price copper, which accounted for about two-thirds of 
Zaire’s foreign exchange. The copper price peaked at $1.40 per pound in April 1974, but it 
began to turn down in May and June. It declined to as low as $0.53 by late 1975; in 1976 it had 
stabilized in the mid-sixties. By early 1976 Zaire was in the middle of a grave economic and 
financial crisis which ‘pushed the state to the brink of international bankruptcy, and the Mobutu 
regime to the brink of disaster.’ As the 1980s approached, Zaire was nearly $ 5 billion in debt 
and on the verge of economic collapse.
89
  
The effects of the continued abuse by Mobutu and his political elite drove the country 
into further decline in the 1980s. Zaire often sought the assistance of Western 
governments, international private banks, international organizations (IMF and WTO) for 
further financial assistance. The system was broken and corruption had rooted itself 
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within the state structure to the point that government and society did not connect in the 
way that they should have.  
Corruption and State Economy 
As mentioned in previous chapters, corruption plays a significant factor in the 
history of Zaire, in this context the state economy is a key factor that contributes to state 
failure. The economy has been used as a weapon by political elites and Mobutu to 
satisfy their hold on the citizens and line the pockets of the more affluent within the 
country. The aristocracy that resided over most of the power within the governing 
structure used state institutions and the state legitimacy as their own tool for personal 
benefit at the expense of the citizens they were supposed to be working for. As a result, 
the aristocracy effectively blocked any economic development within the country by 
depriving the state industry the means to develop production and improve conditions for 
the citizens of Zaire.90  
Other determining factors, that were due mostly to interference from Cold War 
politics, helped to prop up Zaire by pushing out the threat of communism in the country’s 
development and usher in democratic ideology. Mobutu utilized his anti-communist 
appeal to the United States during the height of the Cold War, securing a large amount 
of aid from the West during this period of time to accommodate his lifestyle. According to 
Rotberg: 
 The end of the Cold War sharply increased the Congo’s international isolation and 
legitimacy deficit; bartering its anti-communist credentials for external assistance was no longer 
a feasible option. Just as Mobutu owed his rise to power to the penetration of East-West rivalries 
in the continent, the collapse of the Zairian state must be seen as a casualty of the Cold War’s 
end.
91
 
 Yet, it may be a casualty in that it did not utilize the aid and financial assets that were 
given to it. Mobutu was so effective in his accumulation of wealth from various external 
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sources that he was able to maintain a lifestyle that was inconceivable to the average 
citizen.  
Mobutu’s accumulated fortune was considered to be equal to at least half the 
country’s debt. In the early-1990’s, Mobutu used reserved funds to pay military and 
government employees. 92 Additionally, regional political elites have used their power to 
manipulate markets and withhold funding to secure their power within the state. Utilizing 
state-owned resources, regional elites privatized these state institutions for their own 
benefit.93 Corruption of the economy does not solely emanate from political control over 
the citizen, but is used in the process of resource development and the flow of natural 
resource wealth within Zaire. 
Natural Resource Development and the State Economy 
The natural resource and mineral development within Zaire is one of the original 
attractions for colonial conquest.  Yet, it was closely regulated and monitored for abuse 
among its workers. The revenues generated by natural resources, such as copper 
mining, diamond fields, etc…, generated a level of corruption that affects the product 
revenues and the direction of the revenue within the community. Utilizing these 
resources allowed for governing elites to manipulate the system in their favor. The 
economic environment was not beneficial for the developing state.  
The lack of efficiency in production was permanently damaging the ability of the 
state to grow economically. Domestic markets were introduced to private companies as 
relationships were established through means that only benefited governing authorities 
at the time. According to Van de Walle, “In cases like the ‘Zairianization’ episode in 
Zaire, the policy was a little-disguised grab by the political elite of profitable private 
companies, and the rhetoric of economic nationalism was perfunctory and superficial.”94 
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The governing officials utilized their position to accumulate a massive amount of wealth 
through private contracts and resource procurement at the expense of the nation it was 
supposed to be governing.  
Natural resources and their potential to establish a stable platform for a strong 
economic environment, more often than not reflects the opposite. Zaire has an abundant 
wealth in natural resources and mineral mining within the region. Ezekiel highlights the 
country’s natural resource abundance, “Congo’s mineral wealth includes copper, cobalt, 
gold, diamonds, tantalum, tin, niobium, silver, zinc, uranium, and thorium.” 95  Zaire’s 
utilization of its natural resources and mineral deposits opened doors to patron/client 
relationships between the government and private investors. This relationship catered 
toward the needs of the minority instead of the majority. Reno elaborates on Mobutu and 
his elite cadre’s effectiveness in obtaining natural resource wealth: 
…Mobutu’s elite could manage quite well, so long as their patron could convince foreign 
officials and business deals. The country’ abundant mineral resources attracted shady foreign 
firms willing to deal directly with predatory officials. Mobutu’s commitment to a pro-Western 
stance in the context of the Cold War continued to interest foreign officials, especially in the 
USA, throughout the 1980s. By the early 1990s it appeared as though Mobutu was a creature of 
his Western patrons and would fall or survive in power at their sufferance.
96
  
Zaire also has rented or contracted their oil revenues for decades; prolonging any 
potential benefit that economic and political reform may have in the future. As a result, 
most of Zaire’s oil production was contracted out for years to come. 97 What could 
constitute an uplifting factor in the development of the state economy and the citizens of 
Zaire has been contracted out by corrupt governing officials that have pocketed the 
financial capital from these endeavors and left the citizens to their own devices.  
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Privatization, Predatory Economic Environment, and the State Economy 
The state economy experienced a continual process of decay throughout Zaire’s 
history. In response to this, external groups ranging from NGO’s to private industry have 
been ushered in to maintain services and seek profit within the country under the cloak 
of patron/client relationships between the government and these external organizations. 
Under this class distinction governing officials were increasingly allowed to create these 
relationships under limited, if any governing authority at all. Natural resources were 
rented out to the highest bidder and the elite officials collected at the expense of the 
citizens that were under them.  
In the context of a predatory environment, Mobutu’s political elite were able to 
introduce privatization to Zaire with limited regulatory institutions to monitor the 
developing relationships. The elite cadre that surrounded Mobutu was in better positions 
to exploit privatization to the state. 98  Furthermore, these relationships dictated the 
political policy within Zaire, allowing external influence to gain a foothold in the 
development of the state. According to Reno, “…the comparison shows how the social 
structure of patronage, especially the capacity of local administrators to use their offices 
in line with their own interests to develop their personal networks in illicit trades shapes 
the political strategies that leaders use to try to assert control.”99 The process of decaying 
state institutions and control was not a short one.  
The country did not feel the effects of these factors until well into the 1970s and 
the process continued to develop as the governing forces used external means to 
substitute for depreciating public services within the country, which came at the price of 
their natural resources. The ongoing effects of this relationship are still decades in the 
making, since the means for generating profits were rented out to foreign industrial 
networks and the profits were taken by the governing elite. The West tried to resolve this 
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problem of a declining economic structure by introducing democracy and capitalism as a 
means for the future of Zaire.  
Neoliberalism and Western Influence 
Zaire was unstable during the introduction of neoliberalism by Western powers. 
At the end of the Cold War, democracy flourished through countries all around the world, 
but the basic essentials that needed to be involved for the success for such a style of 
government were not present in Zaire. Zaire had a decaying infrastructure, almost non-
existent domestic/international economy, and the state’s ability to reign in criminal 
activity was not apparent. Forms of capitalism did appear in this newly proposed 
environment, but not to the benefit of the state. Private industry, which was already 
reaping the rewards from past interactions, was not monitored by regulatory systems. 
 Many thought that the introduction of capitalism and neoliberal philosophy would 
boost economic potential within Zaire. Neoliberalism stated that removing any 
government obstacles that interfered with market growth would allow positive economic 
growth within the state. Thus, the growth of privatization would allow for capital to grow 
within the economy.100 Yet, this did not occur, because the lack of regulatory agencies to 
monitor increased activity of private industry ran rampant and the class division 
increased among the citizens. Creating increased inequality and the marginalization of 
the social classes.101In the case of Zaire, the effects of the end of the Cold War and the 
introduction of neoliberal policy within the state made Mobutu create an array of smaller 
economies to subsidize the lack of external resources that were not present. In the past, 
Mobutu took over small and foreign owned businesses within Zaire, ultimately making 
the domestic market state owned and eliminating foreign investment within the country. 
In reality, these purposed state owned industries were distributed among the political 
elite within government. 
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Lack of Technological Innovation and Industry 
 Another hindering factor in the development of the Zairian economy was the lack 
of technological innovation and implementation in industry and agriculture. The lack of 
investment in industrial technology severely limits Zaire’s capabilities to produce and 
export their products at the needed rate. According to Callaghy, “…Zaire is a resource 
rich but technologically backward, with weak productive, as opposed to extractive, 
capacity. Transportation is backward, slow, irregular, unevenly distributed, inconvenient, 
dangerous, and costly.” 102  Furthermore, the ability to increase international trade is 
determined by the ability to utilize such technology. 
Hyperinflation and the Predatory Economy 
Throughout Zaire’s history since the 1980s, the economy has affected many 
functions within the state structure. The Zairian military constantly had to endure inflation 
and try to maintain on a monthly salary of $10 a month in the 1990’s. In late September 
of 1990, the inflation reached 3,000 percent.  In reaction to this the Zairian military 
protested and violence erupted in the industrial sector, which destroyed a major portion 
of their industrial capability.103As a result of this, the economy suffered from a reduction in 
economic investments and a decline in the tourism industry in the late 1990s.  
In response to a predatory economy and a lack of regulation within the economic 
environment the citizens learned to adapt to the behavior of their employers and external 
industry. Trefon explains the general attitude of citizens in everyday life as they try to 
cope with an economic decline: 
 By taking advantage of his boss he feels he has accomplished something positive. This 
type of pilfering is deeply engraved in the Kinois spirit, reflecting the belief that people who do 
not steal when the opportunity presents itself are poor providers to their families. A day without 
stealing is perceived as a lost day.
104
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The occurrence of economic decline has created a type of environment within Zaire. 
Citizens react by viewing what would be generally considered immoral behavior, as a 
legitimate means to help sustain themselves as well as their families. This is a general 
symptom of the effects of a longstanding degradation of citizens working conditions and 
their civil rights. The ineffectiveness of the government to suppress criminal activity has 
forced many foreign investors to seek other means of protection when conducting 
business within the state borders. As a result, contracts between private companies and 
local official were routed through the army to elicit their protection during business 
transaction and production.105 The combination of these factors, both internal/external 
have evolved in nature as the decades wore on and created an economic environment 
that was more about survival than economic development. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, Zaire has experienced many economic factors that have led to a 
devastated economic structure within the country. Ultimately, the state and its citizens 
seemed to give up hope on a capitalist market and adapted their behavior to survive the 
aftermath of such intrusion by private industry that is there to take precious natural 
resources from their country, while political officials reap the benefits from these 
transactions. The last factor that negatively affected the DRC is external intervention. 
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Chapter Six: External Intervention 
 
The independence of the Congo, what would eventually be known as Zaire until 
the 1990s, could not have occurred without the appearance of external groups within the 
development of the newly formed state. These external groups came in a variety of 
forms: international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
private interest groups. For good or bad, external groups and their influence have 
directly shaped the DRC. In large part, the international communities have been using 
these groups as a way to mend the problems plaguing states exhibiting signs of failure 
or who are suffering signs of total collapse. Yet, the issues have not been resolved 
within the DRC.  
The Impact of External Groups on Developing Countries 
Langford alludes to the impact of external groups and their inability to enable 
states exhibiting signs of failure to reemerge with some form of strong development: 
The international community has been treating symptoms, not causes, he continues, 
because peacekeeping focuses on stopping conflict, not remedying the underlying causes of it. 
Moreover, the current system allows economic and humanitarian aid to fall into the hands of 
those who serve to perpetuate the situation. The aid that is donated is to easily routed away 
from those who most need it by corrupt officials, street gangs, or warlords.
106
  
Aid and support from these private/state run institutions often are routed into undesirable 
hands and never benefiting the state itself or its people. This may be due to corruption, 
the interest of authoritarian leadership, or the special interests of that particular group to 
meet their own personal needs. What is apparent is that the international community has 
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failed to remedy the problem for the long term, even if they have made some short term 
gains.  
International Financial Institutions  
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), created economic 
policies for the DRC during the 1980s that initially helped the country in its economic 
turmoil, but were also used to insert policy control in the state’s democratic development. 
In response, Mobutu used this support for his own means and created an image of 
democracy within the country as a ruse to acquire the help of the international financial 
community. According to Owusus, the economic environment in the state of Zaire 
created by international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank, pushed neoliberal economic arrangements and policies that 
slowed the rate of economic development in these countries.107 The policies put forth 
were for the betterment of the society.  
The goals set out for the DRC were not met and in many cases can be seen as 
creating negative development within the country. Milliken alludes to this: 
…the policies of the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund) have become a case study in contradictions. On the one hand, they have 
incorporated pro-active roles in conflict prevention in their dealing with conflict prone societies by 
demanding ‘good governance’ and ‘human rights’ as yardsticks for engagement. On the other 
hand, through cure-all structural adjustment programmes, they have put excessive pressure on 
the already anorexic state to further slim down by selling off state assets, and cutting down on 
military expenditures and subsidies on essential social services.
108
  
Mobutu was not following policies the international community put forth and pressure on 
Zaire which was already showing signs of failure, made the condition of the state worse 
in all aspects of its existence.  
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Non-Governmental Organizations 
External groups such as NGOs, who use their substantial funding to essentially 
meet the needs of the local populace, filled in where state institutions could not or do not 
have the means to provide for their citizens. In this situation, NGOs may or may not have 
an established relationship with the government, which forces them to operate at a 
grassroots level. This may initially help by providing for a population in need of medical, 
educational, and constructional maintenance, but at the expense of not allowing 
infrastructure and state identity to develop at a natural pace.  In some cases, according 
to Milton and Hickey, NGOs are related to special interest groups such as religious 
movements and political groups.  
The recent development of NGO’s within states exhibiting signs of failure can be 
understood by their relationship to special interest groups located in that particular 
country. These special interest groups can be religious groups or political movements 
that connect external aid groups to the community.109 Yet, NGOs are arguably related to 
the rise of neoliberal policy that emerged in the 1980s, as this overwhelming ideology 
emerged so did groups that were meant to spread democracy in failing states. Milton 
and Hickey further allude to the nature of NGO activity that resulted in a rise of neoliberal 
agenda during the 1980s.110 In this light, NGOs were considered in many cases to be a 
nuisance to the failing government that they were supposed to be helping. Zaire is a 
prime example of this. Mobutu used and controlled NGO groups as a way to appease 
the citizens and show that development was occurring when it really was just a short 
term solution to a problem within the society. According to Trefon, state officials consider 
NGO presence in their country to be troublesome, as they become a rival to state 
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authority and compete for funding that comes from external aid to that particular state.111 
Just like international financial institutions, in their mission to solve infrastructure 
problems, NGOs failed to create a bridge between the government and the people.  
Special Interest Groups 
Special interest groups, that provide some of the same services as NGOs, are 
faced with the same problems of an unresponsive and sometimes hostile government; 
this makes the aid and support given produce a negative impact on the society they are 
trying to revive. One example of this is the shipment of aid to a village or town. The aid is 
given freely to the populace or local combatants without thought about what it would do 
to local business. At times it negatively impacts the local economy. Milliken alludes to 
the presence of aid in the local economy and how that can negatively affect the 
development of the domestic economy, “Humanitarian aid often plays into the framework 
of the parallel economy by delivering resources through the hands of combatants. Thus, 
‘despite the best intentions of aid workers, and at times because of them, they become 
logisticians in the war efforts of warlords, fundamentalist, gangsters, and ethnic 
cleansers’…”112. Special interest groups as well as NGOs and international financial 
institutions are not carefully planning their approach and communicating with the state 
government.  
These groups then can be more detrimental to the development of the state. 
According to Brinkerhoff, the intentions of NGO groups and their ability to take the lead 
in providing essential services to the needs of the citizens of the state often bypasses 
the development of government state institutions to take over these functions in the 
future. Yet, this quick-fix action is what initially creates dependency between the state 
and external groups who are trying to assist in the needs of the state. Furthermore, by 
undermining state development the ability of the state to stabilize in the future is further 
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reduced. 113  The effects of external groups within the DRC are considerable. The 
occurrence of external intervention may have prolonged or increased the chances of 
state failure within the DRC. 
Western Influence and the Cold War 
   After the Congo received its independence in the early to mid 1960s external 
influences were already present and contributing to the development of the state. 
Herbert Weiss comments on Western involvement: “Between 1960 and 1962 the Congo 
was essentially under a UN protectorate which in turn was under strong US influence.”114 
Much along these lines, the country formerly known as the Congo was renamed Zaire 
with the help of Western influence and external groups. Callaghy further highlights the 
involvement of Western powers: 
 Major Western powers have repeatedly helped to keep Zaire together, have helped 
Mobutu to come to power and consolidate that power in important ways (while others have tried 
to overthrow him), and, along with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have 
helped to keep him in power. But as the current economic and financial crises show, they are 
much less able to affect the structure and processes, even policies, of his regime in any 
substantial way. The Mobutu regime would not exist today without external support, past and 
present, but the ruler of this patrimonial administrative state and his political aristocracy have 
successfully fought off challenges to their relative autonomy.
115
. 
Much of the formation of the country has been helped along by outside influence, which 
put Mobutu into power, fed his need for wealth, and supplied misdirected aid toward an 
end that resulted in the occurrence of state failure. According to Rotberg, “Although the 
massive infusion of financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank contributed in no small way to satisfying Mobutu’s incessant demands 
for cash, once confronted with their reluctance to oblige, it took all of the pressure that 
the United States could bring to bear on both institutions to ensure that the aid money 
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would keep flowing into Mobutu’s private pockets.”116. Most of this came at a time when 
the political environment was ripe for molding developing countries to fit the needs of the 
battling superpowers during the Cold War.  
The Cold War presented an opportunity for the West to push democracy to all 
countries in hopes of defeating the spread of communism around the world. In light of 
this, the 1960s presented a pool of independent nations from the post-colonial era that 
both sides were determined to impose their political ideology upon with the promise of 
aid and monetary support. Dunning states that the objectives of these two superpowers 
and their aggressive need to maintain some form of superiority over the other left the 
country receiving aid the ability to negotiate terms for receipt of this aid. When the Cold 
War ended, the ability to withhold aid was easier and the conditionality of democratic 
reform was possible, because the threat of the Soviet Union was not present and the 
ability to negotiate the conditions for the aid ceased.117 During this consistent flow of aid 
and financial support, the country was not developing, but democracy and the image of 
Zaire were named to be stable.  
The mask that external support produced for the country was removed when the 
Cold War ended and aid ceased. Herbst alludes to the sudden loss of external aid: “The 
artificially high external resource flow received due to the global strategic competition 
had the effect of masking the fundamental problems the state faced and delaying the 
point at which leaders had to adjust. When the aid associated with the Cold War ended, 
these states simply collapsed.”118 Zaire relied heavily upon Cold War support. Mobutu 
had acquired most of the aid and left little in the way for the state infrastructure and 
institutional development for its citizens.  
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The End of the Cold War and Western Aid 
The substantial decrease in aid going into Zaire after the end of the Cold War 
ultimately led to the downfall of Mobutu and the failure of the state as a whole. Van de 
Walle claims that Zaire along with Kenya, Somalia, and Sudan witnessed their aid totals 
drop by 24 percent between the years of 1990-1996, which was estimated to be $2.3 
billion during the 1990s.119 As a result, Zaire was not politically important to the West as it 
previously was. The race to beat the spread of communism and the need to implement 
democracy around the world was not as urgent and the significance of Zaire as an ally 
diminished. More importantly, besides the decline in funding, the amount of aid that was 
allowed to enter Zaire was heavily restricted by the influence of policy from the West. 
Under terms and conditions the desperate state of Zaire tried to remain stable, but due 
to the lack of governance and the chaotic conditions that surrounded the Zairian citizens, 
the chances of development after the Cold War did not look promising, unless they met 
the demands for the democratic process laid out for them. 
State Recognition in the International Community 
The debate about post-colonial statehood and the effects of declaring these 
former colonies states has been widely argued. The act of the international community 
certifying the Congo/Zaire/DRC as a state and allowing it the same rights granted by the 
standard was detrimental in the country’s development. According to Herbst, “During the 
Mobutu era, the U.S. should have recognized Zaire for what it was, or was not, and 
decertified it as a sovereign nation.” 120  Furthermore, the appropriate steps were not 
allowed to be taken for the Congo to develop on a path that would allow it to succeed in 
a natural progression.  
The reliance on previously created institutional structure was inadequate to meet 
the needs of the country and further advisement on governmental structural 
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development was not provided in a manner that would deem it constructive to the state. 
This proper formation of a state is a scenario put forth in a perfect world, but to push a 
country that has not had any previous experience in state building into the international 
community with hopes of becoming a strong and developed state is not likely without 
outside intervention. So, where did the DRC and the international community go wrong? 
I argue that the early recognition of statehood after the independence of the Congo was 
a questionable judgment. Mobutu used the well intentioned and heavily motivated 
support from the West to build a country that was guided by the influence of Mobutu and 
his political elite. Callaghy reinforces this point, “In pursuing his state formation strategy, 
Mobutu has both relied heavily on external support and sought to limit external influence 
when it impinged on his interests and those of his political aristocracy.” 121 Mobutu’s 
response to further external influence was to play the part of a government developing 
democracy in the progression of steps put forth by the international community, but what 
resulted was the formation of a country that resembled more like an authoritarian state. 
 The support and influence were used to the administration’s advantage and 
state development went unchecked. As Callaghy alludes, Mobutu and elite cadre were 
effective during the Cold War to manipulate Western external actors in their fear of 
communist takeover or a possible collapse of the regime to support the Mobutu 
government. The political elite continued to manipulate state institutions to sabotage 
development to benefit their own accumulation wealth.122 The result of the international 
community’s certification and the unguided flow of aid into the region allowed for a 
permissive environment to be created and the actions of Mobutu to go unchecked. 
Despite this, the ability to intervene by the international community is limited when state 
sovereignty is allowed for a country not meeting the standards of what constitutes a 
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state. Laying blame for the DRC’s current condition can be debated on many levels, but 
ultimately it is the result of an accumulation of factors.  
The Congo’s recognition as a state early in its development restricted the ability 
of the international community to guide the country’s growth. The unregulated amount of 
aid distributed to Zaire under few conditions gave Mobutu the means to create the 
government he desired. Yet, Mobutu’s lack of ability to connect to the international 
community and his own citizens were ultimately to blame for the countries failure. 
The ability of external groups and the governments they are attempting to help 
have an unstable relationship in developing countries. The mix of intrusion within the 
community to the lack of trust that a developing government may have in the motivation 
of external groups supporting their state can be questionable at times. The international 
community’s approach to solving ailing state’s problems is a one dimensional solution. 
As Englebert points out, “The limited success of recent donor-sponsored market reforms 
and democracy promotion indicates that the grand vision of state building, with its one-
size-fits-all approach, is likely to meet resistance.”123 In response to the failures of the 
past in resolving state failure issues, the approach to aid development has come with 
heavy policy influence laden within the agreement of distribution of aid to such countries. 
Donor Aid and State Development 
 If the present government’s administration wanted to stop the implementation of 
these policies, external groups would go right to the source of the problem and deal with 
the community on a grassroots level. According to McNeill, “Development became a 
specialized arena dominated by ‘donor agencies’ dealing with their ‘recipients’, and by 
professional development experts sharing an arcane language in which fundamental 
ethical issues were almost entirely absent.”124 Mobutu’s response to such action was to 
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play the part just enough to fulfill the needs of the international community and the wave 
of external support coming from them.  
He was able to control the flow of aid and use it to his benefit. Mobutu’s ability to 
achieve this was the result of his regime’s ability to maintain control of the state for so 
long. Rotberg claims that external intervention has been blamed for supporting failing 
regimes who would not survive on their own. 125 In addition to indirectly propping up 
unstable regimes, the effects of aid coming into the country may have adverse effects 
even if it does filter down to the domestic level.  
This can happen in a variety of ways, but ultimately the unchecked distribution of 
aid can benefit the strongest in a society leaving the most needy to suffer further for 
these actions. As Milliken points out, aid organizations fail to see the initial impact of 
their activities and assume that their actions result in neutral or positive outcomes in an 
unstable environment.126  The most apparent solution for the unregulated distribution of 
aid and the communication to influence the constructive nature that aid should have in a 
state is to have the initial relationship with the community and the government at the 
very beginning. 
Conclusion 
The combination of appropriately setting the structure for the development of a 
state for future recognition and having a hand in the development of state policy, with 
concerns to economic and institutional development is essential in preventing state 
failure in the future. This was not achieved in the DRC. As a result the early recognition 
of state sovereignty by the international community, the lack of development of state 
institutions, the domestic/international economy, and the unregulated flow of aid by 
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external groups bred an environment of corruption and eventual decay of the state 
identity within the DRC 
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Chapter Seven: Summary and Conclusion 
 
The nature of state failure in the international system is by all means chaotic. As 
can be seen in the case of the DRC, three underlying factors are associated with the 
state’s current condition. The deconstruction of these three factors interlaced to make a 
perfect storm. The deep seated corruption within the government and an eventual decay 
of all aspects of life for the citizens of the DRC occurred as a result of state failure. The 
interconnected nature of each factor is an interesting development and led me in a 
comprehensive approach when researching for this thesis.  
The decay of government institutions is directly related to the distribution and 
communication of external groups. The domestic and international economy is impacted 
by the amount of aid flowing into the state, coupled with the absence of regulatory 
factors that would protect developing business interest in the DRC. The failure of the 
international community to address these issues is not surprising because they were 
approached in a singular fashion and to approach it all at once is overwhelming if not 
initially discouraging.  
In my research on this specific phenomenon the factors identified were a result of 
leadership failure, misuse of aid and the invasive nature of accepting this aid, as well as 
the lack of development of state institutions within the DRC. These sub-factors led to the 
decay of government and their regulatory systems (state institutions), unchecked 
economic behavior, and the unregulated intervention of external groups within the DRC. 
To supplement the loss of services or to infuse monetary aid within the country without 
the requirement of follow-on structural adjustments proved to not benefit the country in 
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its attempts to develop. Nor, did the aid of external intervention reap benefits from these 
endeavors.  
In the case of the DRC, these attempts seemed did not work because an unruly 
government abused the aid that was given (whatever their motives may have been). 
Mobutu was well documented in his use of monetary aid during the Cold War, which 
could have been used for infrastructure development. Natural resources are abundant 
throughout the DRC, but have been rented out through patron/client relations throughout 
the previous decades to external business entities. The developments of these 
relationships have hindered the use of natural resources for the enrichment of the 
country. External groups: NGOs, private industry, and governmental groups have 
implemented aid programs, policies, and external presence within the country that could 
be viewed on many levels as detrimental to the state’s development. Yet, due to these 
factors the separation of the citizens and their government has not allowed for the 
development of state identity which is essential. The culmination of these factors has left 
the country in disarray and considered a failed state within the international community. 
Decades of efforts have not brought the country to a level of economic and political 
stability. 
In order to stabilize the DRC, the state would have to make an evolutionary leap 
or a jump start to revitalize the country. State institutions would have to be reengaged to 
allow the flow of aid and trade to develop the country. Legal systems would have to be 
put in place as well as enforced to manage the levels of corruption that have plagued the 
DRC since its independence. The state government should monitor, under the guidance 
of external intervention, contract agreements dealing with natural resource development 
and the production coming from the DRC. The state under these conditions would be 
heavily regulating market development until domestic and international economies could 
be standardized under rule of law. When stabilization is established then regulatory 
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process would relax restrictions and allow for development to take place at a normal 
pace. This approach has been used in other cases, but the theory that it would work in 
all cases of state failure is not a guarantee.  
The question of state sovereignty would have to be addressed. The 
categorization of the DRC as a state would either have to be downgraded or be 
mentored by an external entity. The actual achievement and responsibility of this would 
be substantial for the host country.  
External groups would be the key to development within the DRC. Despite the 
misuse of appropriated funds or the lack of communication between government 
entities/aid groups the DRC needs external intervention to succeed in the developmental 
process. Without a relationship with the government, external involvement within the 
country would likely have no lasting effect. Connecting state government and its 
institutions to the external flow of aid coming into the country is a way to allow for 
positive growth.  
The local economy would have to be established and regulated by the 
government until the creation of laws and the enforcement of these laws are established. 
International aid and local businesses would have to support the development of a 
domestic economy with minimal negative impact. After the establishment of the domestic 
economy the involvement of international interests in the production and distribution of 
natural resource procurement would then be allowed. Previous contracts and resource 
acquisition agreements that were previously established would have to be up for review 
and reevaluated for the benefit of the state. The effects of these actions cannot be 
underestimated, but are necessary in reestablishing the ability for the DRC to regain 
control and develop its natural resources.  
External intervention, the lack of economic development, and state Institution 
development interlink to form what is identifiable as the cyclic nature of state failure. 
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Each factor influences the other and if positively reinforced may generate development 
of state identity as a whole. This would possibly reestablish the relationship between 
state government and the citizens within its boundaries. The actions that would have to 
be taken to achieve this would cross boundaries and force the international community 
to face emerging issues that affect all states within the international community itself. 
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